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The objectives of this research are: (1) to examine the
desirability of competition as expressed by current leaders
in the field of major systems acquisition in DOD, in Congress,
and in private industry; (2) to evaluate the adequacy of the
guidance provided by the current acquisition instructions con-
cerning the need, and the methods available, for generating
competition in the acquisition of major weapon systems; and
(3) to provide recommendations for improving the guidance con-
tained in the instructions, including the development of a
model to aid in making decisions regarding production compe-
tition.
The results of this research indicate that competition is
highly desirable, but that the subject is not adequately addresS'
ed in the current instructions. The major contribution of the
Study is the development of a production competition decision-
making model which is presented in Chapter V. This chapter
presents the benefits and various methods of obtaining a second
production source. Also included is a discussion of the fac-
tors which influence the second sourcing decision and a model
for determining which of the second sourcing methods, if any,
is best suited for any particular acquisition program. It is
written as a stand-alone chapter for use as a desk-guide by
program managers and/or contracting officers who are faced
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A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objectives of this study were: (1) to determine
the desirability of generating competition in the major
weapon systems acquisition process, (2) to evaluate the
adequacy of the guidance regarding competition provided by
the current acquisition instructions, (3) to investigate
the methods available for generating a second source, and
(4) to develop a model to aid in determining the viability
of generating a second source and/or production competition
for any particular acquisition program.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In pursuing the objectives of the research, the
following questions were addresses:
1. Do the instructions provide an adequate
definition of competition in the context of major weapon
systems acquisition?
2. Is competition desirable in the acquisition of
major weapon systems?
a. What is the current Federal/Department of
Defense (DOD) policy regarding competition?
b. Do members of Congress consider competition
to be desirable?
c. Do industry representatives consider competi-
tion to be desirable?
3. Is the concept of competition adequately addressed
in current acquisition policy statements and instructions?

4. Is it feasible to develop a model which will aid
the program manager to determine whether or not production
competition will be beneficial to his program and which
second sourcing method is best suited for his acquisition
program?
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information presented in this study was obtained
primarily from the currently available literature on the
subject of major weapon systems acquisition. The literature
base utilized in this study includes current acquisition
directives and instructions (specifically DOD Instructions
5000.1 and 5000.2 of January 1977 and 0MB Circular A-109 of
April 1976), texts of Congressional hearings, acquisition
studies prepared by the military departments, previous
theses and dissertations, and studies prepared by private
companies such as the Rand Corporation, the Logisitcs Man-
agement Institute, and the Institute for Defense Analysis.
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of this study is essentially limited to
weapon system acquisitions and to buys of major components
of such systems. However, the researcher knows of no reason
why the recommendations presented herein could not be applied
to the acquisition of components or systems other than major
weapon systems.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout this thesis it is assumed that the program
manager is free to develop competitive sources where it
appears to be advantageous and that there is one or more

qualified contractors who are eager to become a second
source for the system being procured. It is also assumed
that the reader is familiar with standard DOD contracting
terminology and concepts and with DOD program management
structure, operation, and terminology.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized in the same sequence as the
research questions. Chapter II describes the major weapon
system acquisition process, discusses the importance of the
Acquisition Strategy, and defines the concepts of competition
and second sourcing. Chapter III assesses the desirability
of generating competition in the acquisition process. This
chapter includes statements made in the acquisition instruc-
tions, as well as statements made by Congressmen and industry
representatives. Also included in Chapter III are discussions
of the benefits and problems associated with competition and
the alternatives available to the program manager in the
absence of competition. Chapter IV analyzes the adequacy of
the guidance relative to competition provided by the current
acquisition instructions. Chapter V presents an evaluative
model which can be used by a program manager as an aid in
determining whether or not to pursue production competition
as part of his acquisition strategy. This model was developed
in cooperation with LCDR D.S. Parry, SC, USN and was included
in his thesis entitled, "Second Sourcing in the Acquisition of
Major V7eapon Systems." Finally, Chapter VI presents the con-
clusions drawn from this research and provides recommendations
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for improving the guidance contained in the acquisition
instructions. In addition, the Appendices (particularly




II. FRAMEWORK A^TD DEFINITIONS
A. THE MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS
Appendix A presents the major events and decision
points (milestones) of the acquisition process in graphic
form. The acquisition process begins with the recognition
by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) , or by one of the DOD
component heads, that a mission element is deficient in its
existing or projected capability to meet its essential
mission needs. Formal documentation of the deficiency is
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense in the form of a
Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) . The MENS is limited
to ten pages and is used to "recommend the initiation of
new systems acquisition programs and to document the mission
need and the essential supporting and planning information.
/~4:5_7
"When a mission need is determined to be essential
and reconciled with other DOD capabilities, resources,
and priorities, the Secretary of Defense will approve
the mission need and direct one or more of the DOD
components to systematically and progressively explore
and develop alternative system concepts to satisfy the
approved need." /3 : 3/
This decision by SECDEF is represented by Milestone in the
flow chart. Current policy provides the following guidance
for Phase I of the acquisition process: when feasible the
need shall be satisfied with existing military or commercial
items; when a modification or new development is required,
the needs of other DOD components and NATO standardization
and interoperability shall be considered; competition shall
12

be emphasized among alternative systems so that the best
possible solution may be selected. Phase I includes the
solicitation of ideas from industry as well as from academic
and government sources. The solicitation must be stated
in terms of the mission need, not in terms of the capabil-
ities or characteristics of a hardware or software system.
The responses to the solicitation are evaluated and a
Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) is prepared by the program
manager. The DCP is foinvarded to SECDEF via the Service
System Acquisition Review Council {(S)SARC) and the Defense
System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) , recommending the
systems which should proceed into Phase II, demonstration
and validation. SECDEF reaffirms the mission need and approves
one or more alternatives for competitive demonstration and
validation. This action is represented by Milestone I in
Figure 1 of Appendix A.
In Phase II competitive demonstrations are conducted
to validate the design concepts and to provide a basis for
selection of the preferred systems for full-scale engineering
development. The demonstrations should be conducted with
full-scale prototypes in realistic operating environments
where feasible and practical. Recommendation for a system
to proceed into full-scale engineering development should
be made based on the system's demonstrated ability to meet
the mission need, an evaluation of the remaining risks and
potential resolutions, an evaluation of the estimated
acquisition and ownership costs, and such factors as the
13

contractor's demonstrated management, financial, and technical
capabilities to meet program objectives. /T6:197 This recom-
mendation is forwarded in the form of an updated DCP to SECDEF
via the (S)SARC and the DSARC . SECDEF again reaffirms the
mission need and approves the selection of the systems for
full-scale engineering development at Milestone II on the
flow chart.
During Phase III, full-scale engineering development is
undertaken by the contractors and initial production units
are fabricated. These units are tested and evaluated by an
organization independent of the development and user organi-
zations. The purpose of this independent testing is to insure
effective performance under expected operational conditions.
Also during this phase, the contractors develop and submit
proposals for production. These proposals and the test
results are evaluated and one (or conceivably more than one)
of the systems is recommended for production and deployment.
An updated DCP is prepared for SECDEF 's Milestone III decision,
Phase IV, production and deployment of the system, completes
the acquisition process.
B. ACQUISITION STRATEGY
One of the program manager's first responsibilities is
to develop an Acquisition Strategy tailored to the require-
ments and constraints of his particular program. The
Acquisition Strategy is a document which becomes the under-
lying framework for the entire acquisition process. Its
purpose is to integrate the myriad of technical, schedule,
14

business, and management considerations into a coordinated
plan for the achievement of program objectives in an effective
and efficient manner. The pervasive nature of the Acquisition
Strategy is presented in an excerpt from OFPP Pamphlet No. 1
which is presented in Appendix B. In the view of this
researcher, the nature and extent of competition to be
generated in the acquisition program is one of the corner-
stones on which the Acquisition Strategy rests.
C. DEFINITION OF C0I4PETITI0N
Before proceeding with a discussion and evaluation of
the desirability of competition, it is necessary to clearly
establish and define the concept of competition. The Defense
Acquisition Regulation (DAR) (formerly the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation) provides the following information
relative to competition:
Price competition exists if offers are solicited and
(i) at least two responsible offerors (ii) who can
satisfy the purchaser's (e.g., the Government's)
requirements (iii) independently contend for a
contract to be awarded to the responsive and
responsible offeror submitting the lowest
evaluated price (iv) by submitting priced offers
responsive to the expressed requirements of the
solicitation. /2:3:120_7
The program manager, however, needs a more complete
"working" definition in order to effectively incorporate
competition into his Acquisition Strategy. For example,
the program manager must be cognizant of the existence and
importance of the two basic types of competition, namely
design competition and production competition . In addition,
he must be able to distinguish between the economist's
15

concept of "perfect" competition and the concept of effective
competition relative to both the design and production phases
of his program. Without an understanding of these distinctions,
the program manager can not hope to develop an optimal competi-
tive strategy.
1. Design vs. Production Competition
One of the major conclusions of this research is
that design competition and production competition must be
recognized as independent concepts. In the past, in DOD
instructions, in Congressional testimony, and probably in
the minds of program managers themselves , competition has
been thought of in the generic sense. That is, an acquisi-
tion program was thought of as being competitive so long as
it included either type of competition. There appears to be
some consensus that if the source selection is delayed long
enough so that the configuration of the system has been
substantially established under "competitive pressures",
then the benefits of the design competition will "carry-over"
into the production of the system. 719:49/ The "carry-over"
theory was supported by Senator Hart in 1969 when he said:
If two contractors were undertaking the design of a
system, working in a competitive environment, building
prototypes, knowing that only one would be awarded the
ultimate contract for the manufacture of the system, I
believe this would provide the strongest possible induce-
ment to design a system that is economical to manufacture
and to operate . I believe this competition would be good
for the taxpayers. /i9:4_9/
The following exchange, in 19 74, between Senator
Symington and Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. (then Director of
Defense Research and Engineering) , relative to the prototype
16

competition between Sikorsky and Boeing Vertol for the Army's
UTTAS helicopter, also directly supports the carry over theory
in that it assumes that a lower production price will be the
direct result of competitive development:
Dr. Foster: You, Mr. Chairman, know nothing that
we have found is so effective, when it comes to making
equipment work satisfactorily and better than we had
estimated, than to have two competitors working head
to head with hardware in the field and making the
necessary changes in order to improve the situation.
Senator Symington: Does the hope of long term
savings due to price competition justify the expend-
iture of some $150 million additional to carry two
contractors through development?
Dr. Foster: Yes, sir. /T9 : 50_7
It is unfortunate that the independent concepts of
design competition and production competition have been
allowed to overlap in the language of acquisition. This
overlap leads to confusion about the nature of the two types
of competition and their relationship to each other.
Specifically, the imprecise terminology has led to erroneous
concepts like the carry-over theory. The following dis-
cussion, however, will show that the two types of competition
are independent, that they serve different purposes, and that
achieving the dual goals of obtaining the best system at the
lowest fair and reasonable price generally requires the genera-
tion of both design and production competition.
Design competition is the process of generating
alternative potential solutions to satisfy a mission need,
and the selection of the best system, price, and other factors
17

considered. During the competitive design phase, prior to
source selection, the contractors are required to estimate
the future life cycle costs of their respective systems.
It is emphasized that these estimates -- although they must
be supportable and they are carefully reviewed by the govern-
ment — are neither firm nor ceiling prices for future
production. They are simply "best guess" estimates. The
goal of design competition, as expressed by Deputy Secretary
of Defense Charles W. Duncan, Jr., "is to award the contract
to the best technical proposal within a realistic affordable
price." (Emphasis added). He further states that in the
process of selecting the winning design, "the price
negotiation is constrained to verification of its realism."
/ 5 : 1_0/ It is interesting to note that there is no mention
of the "lowest fair and reasonable price" as a goal of the
design competition.
Production competition, on the other hand, is the
process of obtaining competitive offers from two or more
independent, qualified manufacturers for the production of
identical, or functionally identical, hardware or software
systems. The goal of production competition is to obtain
the lowest fair and reasonable price for the procurement and
the operation and maintenance of the system which was selected
in the competitive design phase. Regardless of "promises" or
projections made about production and life cycle costs in the
design phase, once a system is selected and a sole source
situation occurs, there is little actual incentive for the
18

contractor to work to minimize production costs. Consider
for example, the results obtained under Total Package
Procurement. This approach would seem to be the ultimate
vehicle for maximizing the benefit of the carry-over effect,
because the cost of all the production units were negotiated
under the intense pressure of competitive source selection.
However, Total Package Procurement is now specifically
forbidden by DOD Instruction 5000.2 because of its notable
failures in the C-5A , DD-963, and F-14 contracts. It seems
that under intense competitive pressure, a contractor will
promise almost anything — will even "buy-in" on a binding
fixed price-incentive basis — with the intention of making
up the difference in changes and/or claims during production,
Given the experience with the Total Package
Procurement, it should be clear that if maximum benefit is
to be obtained from competition, the program manager must
give careful consideration to generating both design and
production competition. It is not sufficient for a program
to be considered competitive just because it includes one of
the two types.
One further point should be made with respect to the
invalidity of the "carry-over" theory — The following is
from a study performed at the Defense Systems Management
School in 1974:
During a visit to the Defense Systems Management
School in September 19 74, General Henry Miley,
Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command, expressed
concern that competitive prototype development
under cost-plus incentive fee contracts might also
include increased potential for cost growth and
19

goldplating. The thesis is that, the prime motivator for
the contractors is to win the follow-on contract.
This dominant motivator then renders the cost incentive
fee ineffective in that the contractor will spend what-
ever he feels is necessary to win. The competitive
aspect of this situation might also lead the contractors
to add a little goldplating to their product if they
perceive it will give them an edge over their competition
at source selection for the follow-on contract.
Research of existing literature revealed no discussion
of these potential disadvantages of competitive proto-
type development. Interviews with procurement experts
and project managers were conducted to determine if they
felt there was basis for this concern.
The interviews confirmed that a cost incentive fee was
ineffective in competitive prototype validation and that
the competitive aspect of this situation could increase
the potential for cost growth and goldplating.
The conclusions are that General Miley has identified
an additional potentially very costly, disadvantage to
competitive prototype development. This is not to say
that this type of development is not useful. On the
contrary, being aware of the pitfalls will enable the
government to practice the concept of competitive_proto-
type development to its greater advantage. /6 : ii_/
While the study reported above does not argue against
the use of prototype competition, it does provide additional
evidence that design competition does not automatically lead
to a lower-priced system. The results of this study add
emphasis to the proposition that the acquisition community
in general, and the program manager in particular, must
recognize the independence of the two types of competition
and the need for both design and production competition in
a well-structured Acquisition Strategy.
2 . Perfect Competition vs. Effective Competition
The economist's definition of perfect competition
is based on the existence of four essential market conditions
First, there must be a homogeneous product such that the
20

product offered by any one seller is identical to that
offered by all other sellers. Second, there must be many
buyers and many sellers such that no one buyer or seller
can unilaterally affect the price of the product. Third,
there must be no barriers to entry or exit from the market.
Fourth, bO.th buyers and sellers must have perfect knowledge
of all relevant economic and technological data affecting
the market for the product. /'8:2 347
Obviously, since the defense market consists
essentially of a single buyer, since there are significant
barriers to entry and exit, and since none of the players
has "perfect knowledge" of the economic and technological
data, the program manager is not seeking (and does not
desire) a perfectly competitive environment in which to
procure defense systems. In most situations, however, the
program manager will find it beneficial if he is able to
create "effective" competition. Effective competition
exists when the expected value of the benefits to be de-
rived from competition exceed the expected costs of creating
competition. It should be noted that both the benefits and
the costs of competition can be measured in monetary and/or
non-monetary terms. For example, the value of expanding the
production base for a critical weapon system is a benefit
which cannot be measured in monetary terms. Similarly, the
loss of a critical contractor due to the rigors of competi-
tion could be a non-monetary cost.
The concept of effective competition is directly
tied to the creation of a monopsonistic market. That is,
21

a market consisting of a single buyer and several sellers.
The existence of a monopsonistic market enhances the program
manager's likelihood of obtaining the high quality equipment
he needs, when he needs it, at a fair and reasonable price.
One of the critical questions in the creation of
this market is: "How many 'sellers' are needed in order to
generate effective competition?" The answer to this question
depends on a variety of factors. As is shown in Figure 2 of
Appendix A, the number of sellers decreases as the acquisition
cycle progresses. Therefore, the number of sellers which are
needed is influenced by the phase of the acquisition process
for which competition is being considered. Other important
factors are the quantity of the item being procured and the
start-up costs associated with production of the item.
Effective competition in the design phase usually includes
many different potential sellers. In the production phase,
however, cost-effectiveness considerations may reduce the
number of sellers to only one or two. If only one seller is
selected for production, then the monopsonistic market (and
the opportunity for competition) will disappear. The program
manager will then find that he has become one half of a bi-
lateral monopoly. This situation -- one buyer and one seller -





The term "second sourcing" will be used repeatedly in
the following chapters. Second sourcing can be defined as
the establishment of two or more qualified and independent
sources for the production of hardware or software to satisfy
a particular need. There are several potential benefits
associated with second sourcing and there are at least five
different methods which can be used to establish a second
source. The various benefits and methods are discussed in
detail in Chapter V. It is important at this point to recog-
nize that second sourcing and production competition are
interdependent concepts. That is, in order to generate
effective production competition, the program manager must
insure that there are two or more sources who can produce the
system under consideration. Also, when second sourcing is
undertaken, for whatever reason, it is reasonable to assume
that the program manager will benefit from generating a com-
petitive environment for the acquisition of the system.
23

III. DESIRABILITY OF COMPETITION
This chapter examines the desirability of competition in
terms of current acquisition policy documents and public state-
ments made by DOD officials, members of Congress, and repre-
sentatives of private industry. Also presented in this
chapter are the potential benefits of competition, the
potential problems associated with generating production
competition, and a discussion of the alternatives available
to the program manager in the absence of competition.
A. POLICY STATEMENTS
Even a casual review of the regulations, instructions,
or literature relative to acquisition management reveals the
universal popularity of competition. As evidence of this,
consider the following:
* Deputy Secretary of Defense Duncan made the following
statement in May of 19 78:
Before instituting any acquisition procedure, we must
first recognize that we are dealing in a free enterprise
society. When we go to industry to get proposals for
building our defense systems, we must recognize that
competition essentially dictates success or failure of
the companies with which we deal. Those companies which
are successful are so because they have learned" how to
compete effectively. It is fundamental to any of our
acquisition procedures that we fi.nd ways to take maximum
advantage of this competition. /V:^/
* The Defense Acquisition Regulations (formerly the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations) very clearly state the




* DOD Instruction 500 0.1 requires that the program manager
"direct the program to include maximum use of effective compe-
tition throughout the system acquisition process." /TrS/
* DOD Instruction 5000.2 directs that competition "shall
be a major factor in the acquisition strategy throughout the
program to achieve technical innovation, reduced risks and
cost and effective management. /4':9_7
* 0MB Circular A-109 states that the acquisition strategy
should "encompass methods for obtaining and sustaining compe-
tition." /T7:57 Furthermore, A-109 requires that "disclosure
of the basis for an agency decision to proceed with a single
system design concept without competitive selection and
demonstration will be made to the Congressional authorization
and appropriations committee. 717 : 1_1/
* Members of Congress favor competition as is revealed in
the following dialogue between Senators Proxmire and Chiles:
Senator Proxmire: We need competition early, we need
it late. We need it at all points in a procurement process,
more competition than we have now.... If you do not get that
competition in early, you are missing, I think, the principal
value of competition.
Senator Chil_es : I agree that we should be getting more
competition. /13:12_7
* Representatives from industry recognize the value of
competition in the acquisition process. For example, Mr.
George Schairer, Vice President of -The Boeing Company, stated
in Congressional hearings, "To me, the best way to keep the
costs in hand and the quality of the weapons up, is through
the mechanism of competition." /T3:997 Furthermore, the 15
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member Commission on Government Procurement, which included
many influential businessmen, emphasized the importance of
competition in several of their recommendations to the
President.
B. BENEFITS OF COMPETITION
Very simply, competitive pressures are widely believed
to lead directly to the development of better systems at lower
prices. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the real-
ization of these dual benefits requires the creation of both
design competition and production competition.
Design competition is generated by defining a need in
terms of the mission which must be performed and by encouraging
industry-wide participation in the generation of potential
solutions. It is felt that a greater number of alternatives
will be found by using a competitive approach than if a single
contractor were chosen to design a system to satisfy the
Government's need. Careful examination of the alternatives is
expected to lead to the selection of two or more which are
suitable for further development and evaluation. Ultimately,
the design which offers the best combination of performance
and expected life-cycle cost will be selected. A technique
for creating design competition called "parallel undocumented
development" has the potential not only to generate the best
technical solution, but also to reduce the development cost
of the competing prototypes. In a study performed by Barry R.
Lenk for the Office of Naval Research, this method of develop-
ment was described as follows:
26

One of the most promising forms of prototyping is called
"parallel undocumented development" , in which competing
companies develop prototypes with the minimum amount of
documentation needed by the contractor. The Government
evaluates and tests the competing prototypes in order to
select a winner who undertakes the documentation necessary
to manufacture the system. As a result, the design for
configuration management purposes is frozen at a much
later date in the development cycle, and the contractor
gains substantially more responsibility and flexibility
during the development phase. In addition, the decrease
in required documentation should result in decreased cost
of^ development, as high as 50% according to some estimates.
/ 10 : 187
With respect to the cost savings potential of competitive
versus sole source procurement, the following are examples of
the estimates which have been derived by various organizations:
* One of the most frequently quoted estimates was provided
by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1965, when he stated to the
Joint Economics Committee of Congress that savings on the order
of 25% or more generally resulted from a conversion to compet-
itive procurement from sole source. /7:_1/
* Later in the same hearings, Mr. William Newman of the
General Accounting Office indicated that the estimate of 25%
savings was conservative, based on GAO audit findings. 711:26./
* A 1964 study by the Logisitcs Management Institute
developed average savings of 22.5% experienced in competitive
subcontracting by a major prime contractor. /11:227
* A 19 72 study performed by the Army Electronics Command
reported average savings of 54% from the competitive pro-
curement of several electronics equipments. This strady also
stated, "reasonable confidence could be attached to using at
least a 40% reduction for planning purposes." /"ZO : 1/
27

* A 19 7 8 study by the Army Procurement Research Office
reported average savings of 10.8% on sixteen items which
were shifted from sole source to competitive procurement.
It i« worth noting that five of the sixteen items included
in the study showed a net loss rather than a savings, and
that the 10.8% figure is the net savings after deducting the
cost of generating competition. For the eleven items which
did show a net savings, the savings ranged from 2.7% to 51%,
with an average of 18% — after deducting the estimated cost
of generating competition. / 12_/
* A particularly interesting example is provided in a
report by David V. Lamm which indicates that a price reduction
of more than 50% was realized when a sole source producer of
missile rocket motors discovered that the Naval Air Systems
Command was merely initiating actions to develop a second
source. /9 : 4_/
When viewed with respect to the overall DOD procurement
budget, these potential savings are truly dramatic. With a
1980 procurement budget of approximately 35 billion dollars,
every 10% increase that can be generated in production compe-
tition represents potential savings of between 500 million
and 1 billion dollars per year (assuming the average savings
resulting from competition is between 15 and 30 percent.)
Another potential benefit of competition, especially
prototype competition, is that it may speed up the development
process. In Congressional testimony, Mr. George Schairer of
The Boeing Company said:
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Our AWACS prototype has been terribly important. It
allowed us to learn things and make progress that would
never have been possible any other way. It speeded the
process up. The_prototype , in fact, led us to a better
weapon sooner. /13/
An indirect benefit of competition is that it lends
an air of credibility and fairness to the source selection
process. It has been suggested that much of the attraction,
from the viewpoint of Congress, lies in the appearance of
evenhandedness and equity inherent in competitive procure-
ment. /l9:5_57
C. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
There are several problems, or potential problems,
associated with the generation of production competition,
such as
:
* Additional front-end costs — There are additional
tooling and start-up costs as well as technical data package
and/or technology transfer costs associated with establishing
a second source. In order for production competition to be
cost-effective, the additional cost must be more than
compensated for by reduced procurement and ownership costs.
* Willingness of contractors to participate — Difficulties
may be experienced in securing the cooperation of the original
developer or in obtaining offers from qualified second sources.
This is particularly true when the system to be procured also
has extensive commercial as well as military applications.
* Maintenance of the data package and coordination of
engineering changes is more complicated when more than one
contractor is involved in production of the system.
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* Dilution of learning curve/economies of scale --
Dividing the production quantities between two or more sources
reduces the beneficial effects of the learning curve and
eliminates some economies of scale.
These, and other problems have been raised, suggesting
that effective production competition may not be feasible or
desirable. For example, in 19 69 GAO cited these problems in
concluding that "the Directed Licensing technique would not
provide a workable soluting to the problem or reducing the
cost of major weapon systems." /21_7However , a 1974 Rand
Corporation study by Greg Carter countered each of the
potential problems cited in the GAO report. /'l_7
It is the opinion of this researcher that the program
manager must be sensitive to these potential problems.
However, in the vast majority of cases, the problems can be
either eliminated or minimized by proper advance planning,
early and forthright communication with the contractors,
and selection of an appropriate second sourcing method.
D. ALTERNATI^TES TO COMPETITION
In order to protect its interest, in the absence of
competition the Government usually resorts to considerable
(some would say excessive) involvement in the development
and production process. For example, the absence of design
competition implies that either the Government specifies
the design of the hardware or it contracts with a single
firm as the design agent. In either case, creativity and
innovation are curtailed, with the result that some very
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attractive alternatives may be completely overlooked. In
addition, the Government is inclined to "over- manage" the
development effort by insisting on extensive documentation
and reporting requirements during the development phase.
The absence of production competition has similar
drawbacks. \<lhen contracting with a sole source, the Governm.ent
attempts to protect its interests and create effective cost
control through a variety of techniques such as: (1) the use
of incentive contracts, (2) the requirement for extremely
detailed cost and pricing data under the authority of Public
Law 87-653 (the Truth in Negotiations Act), (3) aggressive
negotiations which sometime take months to reach agreement
on a single contract, (4) involvement in the contractor's
make-or-buy decisions, (5) component breakout decisions,
(6) the conduct of should-cost studies, (7) the use of
value-engineering change clauses, and (8) in the past, the
services of the Renegotiation Board. Most of these tech-
niques could be eliminated, as well as the thousands of
pages of reports they require, if the acquisition were
conducted on a competitive basis.
The use of incentive contracts as a means of controlling
costs and motivating contractors to be efficient producers is
so prevalent in today's world of sole source contracting that
it deserves special discussion. Appendix C provides such a
discussion and concludes that incentive contracts are




The "bottom line" of this section on Alternatives to
Competition, is that effective competition in both design
and production is more valuable in terms of obtaining
the best system at fair and reasonable prices than all the





IV. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS
The previous chapter provided evidence of the universal
popularity of the use of competition in major weapon systems
acquisition. The gudiance contained in the major instructions
dealing with systems acquisition make it very clear that the
official policy of the Department of Defense is to employ the
maximum use of competition in order to obtain the required
weapons at the lowest fair and reasonable price. The instruc-
tions, at least in general terms, emphasize the need for
competition throughout the acquisition process.
A closer review, however, reveals that despite the whole-
hearted support for competition found in the current instruc-
tions, the actual guidance provided on the subject appears to
be deficient. The deficiency can be stated as (1) a failure
in the instructions to distinguish between the concepts of
design dompetition and production competition, and (2) a lack
of guidance for program managers with respect to the need for
and the methods of generating production competition .
The current instructions, specifically DOD Instructions
5000.1, 5000.2, and 0MB Circular A-109, state in considerable
detail, the reasons for and the nature of the required design
competition. For example, the instructions state that the
primary method for generating design competition is based on
the widest feasible solicitation of industry, educational
institutions, and Government laboratories for concept
formulation proposals. ^^Thenever possible, prototypes will
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be used as the basis for testing the capabilities of the most
promising designs. The following additional guidance is also
provided:
* DOD Instruction 5000.1 requires that:
Competent industry and educational institutions, regard-
less of size shall be the primary sources for the explor-
ation of competitive system design concepts. Government
laboratories, federally funded research and development
centers and other not-for-profJ.t organizations may also
be considered as sources. / 3 :_5/
* DOD Instruction 5000.2 says the following with respect
to prototype demonstrations:
Competitive demonstrations should be conducted with full
scale prototypes in realistic operating environments
when feasible and practical. When demonstrations at the
system level are not feasible or are impractical, competi-
tive prototype demonstration of critical subsy£tems shall
be considered in the same manner as systems. /4:97
* 0MB Circular A-109, in addition to the requirement cited
earlier to report the rationale leading to a non-competitive
design selection to Congress , also gives the following guid-
ance :
Development of a single system design concept that has
not been competitively selected shall be considered only
if justified by factors such as urgency of need, or by
the physical and financial impracticability of demonstrat-
ing alternatives. /TV: 10/
While the instructions do not absolutely require the use
of design competition, they make it clear that non-competitive
design selection is expected to be the rare exception, rather
than a convenient alternative. These statements also indi-
cate that program managers are expected to include in their
acquisition strategies full-scale prototype competition, or




The instructions do not discourage production competition,
however, they are completely silent on the subject except for
an occasional reference to general principles, such as the
need for "effective competition through the program," or the
desirability of "obtaining and sustaining competition." The
significant deficiency is that in the one hundred or more
instructions applicable to the management of major systems
acquisition, there is no mention of the types of possible
production competition or the methods by which production
competition can or should be generated.
A review of Senate Bill S-5, which is currently under
discussion in Congress, reveals similar deficiencies. Entitled
the "Federal Acquisition Reform Act," this bill proclaims the
importance of competition as a means of cost reduction, as a
substitute for regulatory controls, and as an incentive for
innovation and application of new technology in the private
sector to meet the needs of the federal government. When
viewed from the standpoint of its effect on the amount of
competition generated in major systems acquisition, the bill
seems to be primarily a formal recognition by Congress of the
principles of 0MB Circular A-109. For example, the bill in-
corporates the philosophy of A-109 in the following areas:
* Requirements should be stated in terms of functional
need, not in terms of hardware design, so that, "prospective
suppliers will have maximum latitude to exercise independent




* Large scale acquisitions are to be initiated "only after
the item or equipment to be acquired has been proven adequate
by operational testing."
* For competitive procurements where price is a "primary
or significant factor, the Government's evaluation shall be
based, to the maximum extent practicable, on the total cost
(i.e., life cycle cost) to meet the public need.
* When awards are made for alternative approaches,....
whether for design, development, demonstration, or delivery,
the contractors shall be sustained in competition until
sufficient test or evaluation information becomes available
to narrow the choice to a particular product or service .
(Emphasis added) Once again, design competition is mandated
when practical, but production competition is ignored.
With respect to production competition, S-5 states that
in the event that a non-competitive source selection is made:
Where there is no commercial usage of the product or
service . . . and the military department head determines
that substantial follow-on provision of such product or
service will be required by the Government, the military
department head shall, when he deems appropriate , take
action through contractual provision or otherwise, to
provide the Government with the capability to establish
one or more other competitive sources. (Emphasis added)
This paragraph in S-5 at least mentions the idea of
production competition. However, it seems to be directed
to situations where the original source selection was made
in a non-competitive environment. Furthermore, the wording
of the paragraph itself is weak, in that it gives the military
department head the authority (which he already has) to seek a




If it is signed into law, the Federal Acquisition Reform
Act may have a significant impact on the federal acquisition
community in general; however, it will probably have little,
if any, impact within DOD with respect to increasing the
amount of competition, particularly production competition,
generated in the acquisition of major systems.
In summary, it is the opinion of this researcher that the
current instructions adequately address the concept of design
competition, but that they are deficient with respect to the
subject of production competition.
The next chapter presents information relative to second
sourcing and production competition which should be made
available to program managers in order to strengthen the
guidance provided to them on the subject of competition.
37

V. THE SECOND SQURCING METHOD SELECTION MODEL (SSMSM)
A. PREFACE
As outlined in Harvey T. Gordon's memorandum of
13 February 19 79/Appendix d7, there are a number of techniques
for establishing a second source for production of a weapon
system. The process of deciding which, if any, of these
techniques to use should follow a logical series of steps:
(1) specific objectives/policy goals to be fulfilled must be
clearly stated and understood, (2) a determination must be
made as to the adaptability of the project in question to
second sourcing, and (3) the acquisition alternative that
will best achieve the stated goals must be selected. Mr.
Gordon went on to delineate seven potential reasons for
establishing a second source:
(1) broadening the production base
(2) evening out the fluctuation in the defense industry
which leads to feast or famine situations for indi-
vidual firms
(3) achieving savings through increased competition
(4) achieving superior equipment through increased
competition
(5) facilitating NATO participation as co-producers
or through offsetting co-production as sub-
contractors
(6) facilitating the attainment of socio-economic
goals by increased award to minority and small
business contractors, and,




It is fully conceivable that some of these objectives
may, in fact, be in conflict. If such is the case, a determi-
nation must be made as to the relative importance of said
objectives so that those having the greatest impact may be
considered as controlling.
Once the reasons for second sourcing have been establish-
ed, this chapter presents a model which may be used by the
Program Manager and/or the Contracting Officer in determining
(1) whether or not the generation of a second source is
feasible, and (2) which second sourcing methodology is best
suited to the given acquisition situation. It is intended
that this chapter be of sufficient breadth and depth that it
can stand alone -- apart from the rest of the thesis. As a
stand alone document, the chapter can be extracted from the
thesis and used as a decision tool by program managers faced
with second sourcing decisions. The Second Sourcing Method
Selection Model (SSMSM) was developed jointly by this re-
searcher and LCDR Dennis S. Parry, SC, USN who also utilized
the model in his thesis entitled, "Second Sourcing in Major
Weapon System Acquisition."
The following topics will be discussed in the remainder
of this chapter: methods of generating a second source;
variables affecting the second sourcing decision; and, the
model itself — including its format, the rationale behind
the effectiveness factors incorporated therein, and a dis-
cussion of the actual use of the model.
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B. METHODS OF GENERATING SECOND SOURCES
This section discusses five methods which can be used
to provide two or more sources for second source production
of a weapon system. Each method has advantages and dis-
advantages. The five methods to be described in the following
pages are: form-fit- function, technical data package,
directed licensing, leader- follower , and contractor teams.
It should be emphasized that, where possible, the decision
of whether or not to pursue second sourcing should be made as
early as possible in the life of the program so that the
development contracts can be structured to facilitate the
technology transfer which is essential to production compi-
tition. If the program manager waits until the design
selection is made to consider production competition, he
will probably encounter stiff and possibly insurmountable
opposition from the "other half" of the bilateral monopoly
which he has created.
3
1. Form-Fit-Function (F )
This method involves introduction of a second
production source without need for a technical data package
or for interaction between production sources. The second
source is provided with functional specifications regarding
such parameters as overall performance, size, weight,
external configuration and mounting provisions, and, interface
requirements. This is the classic "black box" concept where
it is not necessary to define the internal workings of the
product. It is used frequently for the acquisition of
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expendable, non-repairable items where the ability of the
system to perform as required is not dependent on what is
inside the "box. " The method does not work well where
field level maintenance of the system is envisioned since
the provision of non-identical items makes stockage of repair
parts and training of maintenance personnel potentially in-
surmountable problems. These objections can sometimes be
overcome by the use of warranty provisions, renewable mainte-
nance contract provisions and/or provisions for contractor
services to set up the necessary government maintenance
capabilities to support the equipment" throughout its lifetime,
The advantages of acquisition by F-^ specifications include:
(a) Detailed design responsibility is clearly assigned
to the contractor. If the item fails to meet
specifications, the contractor must alter the design
until specified operation is achieved.
(b) There is no design data package for the government
to procure or maintain.
(c) Requirements for technical capability within the
government are minimized. This is the path of least
involvement on the part of the government in contract-
ing, contract monitoring, etc.
(d) Standardization can be achieved among multiple
sources through two-way interchangeability of products
which may differ internally. These multiple sources
may be exercised simultaneously.
The disadvantages include the following:
(a) Each procurement contains a development effort
unless the product is off-the-shelf modified. Some
time and money are involved each time the item is
procured for engineering, changes, production learn-
ing curves, and debugging.
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(b) Each time a procurement is made, the contractor who
has the least appreciation for the total significance
of the specification and the effort to accomplish the
task is likely to be the low bidder. This means the
source selection criteria must be very carefully con-
structed to include mechanisms to demonstrate con-
tractor awareness of critical elements as well as his
capabilities to produce the item.
(c) The costs of repair parts will tend to become excessive
when a contractor realizes that he is in a somewhat
sole-source position with respect to his equipment un-
less the total maintenance for the service life of the
equipment is provided for in the procurement contract
while competition is still being maintained.
(d) Careful specification of all external parameters is
_
required to ensure true interchangeability . /15:vi-l£/
2 . Technical Data Package (TDP )
This method involves utilization of a stand alone
technical data package to solicit proposals from manufacturers
who may not have been involved in initial development of the
system or in initial production. Ordinarily this is accomplish-
ed through the invocation of an appropriate data rights clause
in the original R&D or initial production contract. Even where
no such clause exists, it may be possible to buy the data pack-
age subsequent to production. In the absence of such a clause,
the original developer/producer may consider the design, or
portions of it, to be proprietary; and, hence, may be
reluctant to provide a complete TDP to the government. The
cost of procuring the data package subsequent to initial
production may thus be prohibitive. This method assumes that
the data package alone is sufficient to allow production of
the system by alternate manufacturers. Although it has been
successfully utilized, there are frequent examples where
significant difficulties have been faced in applying the
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method. Its chief attraction is that the existence of an
adequate data package can result in the maintenance of a
competitive environment throughout the life of the project.
Although theoretically sound, this method is
perhaps the most hazardous of all the second sourcing
methodologies. It is not well suited for use with highly
complex systems or systems with unstable design or tech-
nologies. Experience has shown that drawings and specifi-
cations alone are often insufficient to secure effective
transfer of manufacturing technology. "The critical factors
may be craftsman's skills, ingenious processes, 'tricks of
the trade', and esoteric shop practices that cannot be
reduced to formal or informal paper." / 8 : 8_37
Once the data package has been accepted from the
developer, the government effectively guarantees its accuracy
and adequacy to the second source. If defects are sub-
sequently discovered in the TDP , as is almost always the case,
the second source may have the basis for a claim against the
government. Some methods of minimizing this particular
problem include: requiring the producer of the data package
to certify its adequacy; pre-production evaluation by the
second source; and, the use of latent/patent defects clause
in the contract with the second source, to name a few.
The use of a latent/patent defects clause, however, is
experiencing significant disfavor, because it is being main-
tained by many legal representatives that the mere existence
of such a clause is tantamount to governmental acknowledgement
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of the inadequacy of the package. This puts the government
in a precarious legal position in the event of subsequent
claims.
There are other problems associated with the TDP
approach. Although there are those who maintain that if
the system was developed under government contract, there
should be no proprietary rights to any of the data; the
fact remains that much of the data required for successful
technology transfer may be encumbered with claims that the
information is proprietary. These problems center on the
definition of "proprietary data" and "trade secrets" and on
whether or not the government has the right to require the
dissemination of such information. A complete discussion
of these questions is beyond the scope of this study, how-
ever, they are discussed in detail in a Rand Corporation
report by James W. McKie entitled "Proprietary Rights and
Competition in Procurement." A 1975 report of the National
Materials Advisory Board of the National Academy of Sciences
entitled "The Effectiveness of the Army Technical Data Package
in Technology Transfer for Procurement" provides valuable
information regarding the use of the TDP as a vehicle for
generating production competition.
The major advantages of second sourcing via the
TDP include:
(a) The TDP can be used repeatedly in maintaining a
competitive atmosphere throughout the production
phase of the acquisition.
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(b) Once the TDP is validated and proven adequate for
production of the system, the mechanics of second
sourcing are relatively simple. There need not be
any contact between production sources and it is
even possible to eliminate the original source
altogether.
The primary disadvantages of the method are:
(a) It may be exceptionally difficult to obtain a
complete and accurate TDP that is free of en-
cumbrances and which, when followed, will yield
a qualified product.
(b) The procuring authority must have access to
whatever "in-house" talent is necessary to ensure
resolution of data package problems.
(c) Even where drawings and specifications are com-
plete and accurate, transfer of complex technology
is often impossible without the benefit of engineer-
ing liaison between sources of production.
(d) Technological differences between companies
(e.g., differing process methodologies) may be
such that the second source does not have the
capability of performance in accordance with the
data package.
3. Directed Licensing (PL )
In its pure form, this method involves the inclusion
of a clause in the early development contract allowing the
government to reopen competition for follow-on production,
select a winner, and appoint him as a licensee. Then, in
return for royalty and/or technical assistance fees, the
licensor (development contractor) will provide the licensee
with manufacturing data and technical assistance to help the
second source become a successful producer.
As used in some current acquisitions, licensing
agreements are also being negotiated where no provision for
such an agreement was included in the development contract.
Such arrangements may, however, be considerably more costly
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than those specified in the original development contracts.
There has also been a trend toward allowing the licensor to
choose his own licensee — subject to government approval.
This method involves not only the transfer of data
from the developer to the second source, but also provides
for the transfer of manufacturing "know-how". The developer
is normally awarded the first production contract and is
contractually bound to licensing another contractor for
production of an unspecified number of future systems. In
fact, the provisions of the licensing agreement (including
royalty fees; if any) should normally become one of the
source selection criteria used in choosing the winning
developer.
Directed Licensing seeks to solve technology
transfer problems associated with the TDP methodology by
providing for necessary engineering and manufacturing
liaison between the sources which is then incentivized through
the royalty procedure. It derives its attractiveness from the
fact that subsequent reprocurements can be competed -- in
whole or in part — even where complex systems technology is
involved. The technique of commercial licensing has been
used successfully in industry for years, especially by firms
desiring the sale of their products in foreign markets. In
fact, more than 10,000 aircraft have been manufactured by
companies that were not involved in the original R&D work. P _/
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Promising as directed licensing may appear, it does
entail the incursion of significant identifiable costs. If
the royalty fee is unreasonable, the benefits of competing
the production buy will be significantly reduced. If the
developer can provide an acceptable product at a lower price
than could a second source, however, the government need not
actually exercise the licensing option. The mere threat of
competitive options may be sufficient incentive for the
developer to maintain efficiency and keep costs to a minimum.
For a more detailed discussion of directed licensing,
examination of the Rand Corporation report by Gregory A.
Carter entitled: "Directed Licensing: An Evaluation of a
Proposed Technique for Reducing the Procurement Cost of
Aircraft" /""i./ is invited. In 1969, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) performed an evaluaticn of the feasibility of
implementing directed licensing. The resultant report / 21_7
cites several potential problems with the technique and
concludes that directed licensing would not provide a workable
solution to the problem of reducing the cost of major systems.
The potential problems cited by GAO are addressed in the
Carter article and are considered critical to understanding
and evaluating and the potential effectiveness of directed
licensing.
The advantages of directed licensing includes:
(a) The potential for production competition is main-
tained throughout the acquisition cycle •
(b) The government need not become closely involved with
the actual transfer of technology between sources.
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(c) Quantity production decisions and source of supply
decisions can be postponed until later in the acqui-
sition process.
(d) The designer is provided with protection as to how,
or in what markets, the second source is to be
licensed to sell the product; and, the designer
may be compensated for each item produced by the
second source.
The disadvantages of directed licensing include:
(a) The existence of royalty and technical assistance
fees increases the cost of the acquisition and
could be prohibitive.
(b) It may be difficult to achieve the necessary
degree of cooperation between alternative pro-
duction sources, and the licensee may have little
recourse against half-hearted cooperation on the
part of the licensor.
(c) Some contractors may bid on projects simply to
obtain proprietary information on other producers'
designs
.
(d) It may become difficult to maintain design account-
ability.
4 . Leader-Follower
The DAR defines leader-follower as "an extra-
ordinary procurement technique under which the developer
or sole producer of an item or system (the leader company)
furnishes manufacturing assistance and know-how or other-
wise enables a follower company to becoma a source of
supply for the item or system." DAR limits the use of
this technique to situations when all of the following
conditions are present:
(a) the leader company possesses the necessary
production know-how and is able to furnish requisite
assistance to the follower;
(b) no source of supply (other than a leader company)
would be able to meet the government's requirements
without the assistance of a leader company;
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(c) the assistance required of the leader company
is limited to that which is essential to enable
the follower company to produce the items; and
(d) the government reserves the right to approve
contracts between the leader and follower
companies
.
DAR suggests the following three methods for
establishing a leader- follower relationship (no prefer-
ence is indicated as to which method should be used)
:
(a) One procedure is to award a prime contract to an
established source (leader company) in which the
source is obligated to subcontract a designated
portion of the total number of end items required
to a specified subcontractor (follower company)
and to assist the follower company in that pro-
duction.
(b) A second procedure is to award a prime contract
to the leader company for the requisite assistance
to the follower company, and another prime contract
to the follower company for production of the items.
(c) A third procedure is to award a prime contract to
the follower company for the items, under which
the follower company is obligated to subcontract
with a designated leader company for the requisite
assistance.
Leader-follower procurements have been undertaken
in the past more for the purpose of meeting delivery schedule
requirements due to the lack of capacity of a single source,
rather than for increasing competition. However, since the
concept encompasses dual or parallel production lines,
splitting the award quantity on a high-low percentage basis
would still insure a significant degree of competition for
the annual production contracts.
The advantages of leader-follower are similar to
those of directed licensing in that:
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(a) It provides a technique .for transferring part o.f-
all of the production or a comple|( system to a
second source.
(b) Competition can be utilized to determine the
acquisition split award to each qualified producer
even when two sources are maintained throughout the
acquisition cycle.
(c) It has been used successfully in the past.
The major disadvantage of the leader-follower
technique is that "leader" companies may be less enthusiastic
about this technique than directed licensing because leader-
follower contains no royalty provisions for proprietary data
nor does it provide some of the protection that may be present
in a licensing arrangement.
5 . Contractor Teams
A recent innovation in the generation of production
competition is represented by the contractor teams which are
currently competing in the design selection phase of the
Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) system. In the
solicitation for the design of the ASPJ, the Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) required that offerors form teams of two or
more contractors. This acquisition strategy envisions the
award of a production contract to the team which eventually
wins the design competition. Following initial production,
both contractors are expected to have the capability to pro-
duce the complete system. DAR provides a brief discussion
of contractor teams including a policy statement on the use
of teaming arrangements. The implication of DAR is that the
government will generally permit contractor teams, but it
does not mention actions by the government to require the
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formation of teams as was done on the ASPJ. DAR does mention
that some contractor teaming arrangements may violate anti-
trust statutes. The program manager and/or the contracting
officer must be sensitive to this possibility in order to
prevent its occurrence.
The advantages of requiring contractor teams are:
(a) It should prevent most of the problems in qualifying
a second source, since at least two contractors were
involved in the design and initial production.
(b) It should also reduce or eliminate the feeling on
the part of either contractor that trade secrets
or proprietary data are being given away to outside
sources
.
(c) No liaison fees or royalties will be involved in
the establishment of the second source.-
(d) The design talent of two contractors will be brought
to bear on each proposal, thereby increasing the
opportunity for successful and innovative designs.
(e) It provides a vehicle for increasing the capacity
of the industrial base.
The disadvantages of contractor teams are:
(a) The design phase may be more costly since at least
two contractors are involved on every proposal.
(b) It requires a great deal of cooperation and
coordination by the contractors.
C. VARIABLES AFFECTING THE PRODUCTION COMPETITION DECISION
The selection of the "best" method for generating pro-
duction competition will vary depending on a number of factors
extant in any acquisition program. The existence of these
factors (i.e., decision variables) presents the program
manager with a difficult, multi-faceted decision situation.
He must consider the strengths and weaknesses of each
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competitive method in relation to the influence of the
variables in his acquisition program.
In order to assist the program manager in logically and
systematically selecting the optimal competitive method, an
evaluative model is needed. The model should rank each of
the competition techniques against each of the decision vari-
ables. Then, by objectively evaluating the influence of each
of the variables, the program manager will be led to an
optimal choice of which method of competition to use in his
program. At a minimum, one or two methods may be shown to
be clearly superior to the others, thereby reducing the com-
plexity of the decision situation.
The next section presents such a model. Before
describing the model, however, it is necessary to define
the decision variables on which the model is based and to
describe the general impact which each of the variables has
on the feasibility of production competition.
SECOND SOURCE DECISION VARIABLES —
1. Quantity to be Procured
The ultimate quantity to be procured and the rate
at which the government will place orders for production
will have a significant effect on the adaptability of the
project to second sourcing. In general, the larger the
quantity to be procured, the more feasible it is to have
production competition. The ideal situation for second
sourcing would entail large quantities needed at a rapid
rate over a number of years. Any deviation from this ideal
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As alluded to above, it is generally true that the
longer the duration of the projected production, the more
feasible second sourcing becomes. For example, suppose the
production phase is to be only four years long, and it takes
at least two years to bring a second source on line (including
source selection, start-up of the plant, and production of a
learning/qualification quantity). In this case, there would
be only a year or so left for production of the system by the
second source, in which case second sourcing would be an in-
appropriate strategy.
3. Slope of the Learning Curve
The flatter the slope of the learning curve, the
more adaptable the project becomes to second sourcing. With
a steep learning curve, the more units produced by the original
source before a second source is brought "on-line", the more
unlikely it becomes that the second source can effectively
compete with that original producer who is, by then, a more
experienced and efficient producer.
4 Complexity of the System
The more complex the system, the more essential is
the need for cooperation and liaison between the two production





If the technology employed in the system is at the
leading edge of (or advances) the state-of-the-art, it becomes
unlikely that a second source will be able to produce the
system without significant difficulties — probably necessi-




Other Potential Government or Commercial Applications
If the system has wide applicability for other govern-
ment or commercial uses , the original developer is more likely
to demand some form of protection for his "trade secrets" or
"proprietary data" than if the market for the product is very
limited. On the other hand, the interest of potential second
sources in the project will be stimulated if other applications
for the hardware exist.
7 Degree of Privately Funded R&D
The greater the degree of privately funded R&D on
which the design is based, the more reluctant the developer
will be to release his design to a second source. This is
particularly true if no restrictions are placed on the use
of the design by that second source.
8. Cost of Unique Tooling/Facilities
As special tooling/facilities requirements and
costs increase, the number of potential second sources
decreases and probability of being able to bring a second
source on line in a cost effective manner decreases. Also
pertinent will be other start up and non-recurring costs.
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including first article acceptance testing. The higher
these costs become, the more difficult it is to amortize
them over the duration of the acquisition.
9
.
Maintenance Concept to be Employed
Second sourcing, with its multiple producers, can
have significant impact on the maintenance considerations of
the system. Whenever two systems of the same type are
non-identical, the ability to support those systems with field
level repair parts and maintenance personnel becomes diluted.
10
.
Cost of Transferring Unique Government Owned
Tooling/Equipment
If any unique government-owned tooling is difficult
or expensive to transfer from one contractor to another, it may
be necessary to provide duplicate sets of tooling in order for
a second source to become a viable competitor. The cost of
transferring tooling, then, can work in the same manner as the
cost of the tooling itself in inhibiting the adaptation of the
project to second sourcing.
11. Contractor Capacity
If the original producer does not have the ability
to produce needed quantities of the system according to the
required delivery schedule, development of a second source
may become mandatory. Lack of adequate capacity may thus be
considered a controlling factor in deciding for second sourcing.
If, on the other hand, the original producer has sufficient or
even excess capacity, reduction in the production quantities







The longer the production lead time, the longer it
will take to bring a second source in line and the less
appealing becomes the second sourcing option.
13. Contractual Complexity
The more complex the original production contract
(e.g.. Life Cycle Cost parameters. Design to Cost consider-
ations. Warranty Agreements) the less adaptable to second
sourcing the project becomes. With warranties, for instance,
it may be necessary to keep two sources capable of performing
warranty work throughout the life of the project -- even
though a production buy-out may have been exercised at some
point in the acquisition.
14 Amount and Type of Subcontracting
If the number of qualified subcontractors is
limited and the degree of reliance on those subcontractors
is necessarily heavy, the benefits to be realized through
second sourcing are necessarily lessened.
D. THE MODEL
The Second Sourcing Method Selection Model (SSMSM)
shown on the following pages is heuristic in nature. Its
objective is to provide a logical and systematic framework for
evaluating the applicability of each of the competitive methods
in light of the variables present in the acquisition situation.
The end result of the evaluation process will (at best) be the
selection of the optimal competitive technique. At worst, use
of the model should serve to eliminate one or more techniques
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from further consideration. In that case, the decision
situation will have been simplified and certain variables
should emerge as being critical, thereby, suggesting the
areas which need further investigation and/or consideration.
1. Format of the Model
It should be noted that the model is actually two
models. The pre-production model (page 67) is for use by
the program manager who is developing his overall acqui-
sition strategy. In other words, the program second sourcing
decision is being made at some point prior to DSARC II. The
post-production model (page 68) is for use by a program
manager who is already in the production phase of the pro-
gram and is considering the generation of a second source
for part or all of the remaining life of the acquisition.
It is necessary to differentiate between the two situations
because the effectiveness factors assigned to each of the
methods change significantly depending upon whether the
second sourcing decision is being made early or late in the
program-* s life cycle.
The SSMSM lists the fourteen decision variables
vertically on the left. Each of these variables is divided
into two or three categories (e.g., high-medium- low, yes-no)
to allow the model to be tailored to the refinements of a
given acquisition situation. Across the top of the model
are listed the second sourcing methodologies. It should be noted
that the five methods, (F-^, TDP , DL, LF, and CT) , when placed
in that order, represent a line of continuum with respect to
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the degree of cooperation and contact needed between the
original developer and the second source. For example,
second sourcing on the basis of F"^ or TDP involves no need
for contact between the two contractors. At the other
extreme is CT which representa a formal alliance between
two or more contractors. Recognizing this relationship
among the methods provides a better understanding of the way
each method relates- to the variables and to the other methods.
Understanding this relationship may even lead to effective
modification or hybridization of the techniques not pre-
viously considered.
2. Effectiveness Factors
The model rates the effectiveness of each of the
methods with respect to each of the decision variables. A
simple three point system of "+" , "0", or "-" is used to
denote whether a given method is particularly strong, neutral,
or weak with respect to each of the variables. In addition,
an "X" is used to denote a situation where the use of a given
method is particularly inappropriate, or, to caution that
particular care should be used in applying a given method in
that situation. A "*", on the other hand, indicates that the
method is particularly well suited to the situation under
consideration
.
The three point system is used because of the
non-quantifiable nature of the model. A wider scale (-5 to
+5, for example) would merely invite argument over the rank-
ings assigned and would detract from the main purpose of the
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model. The primary value of the model is that it serves as
a guide to the subjective decision process and that it gives
recognition to the differences among the methods. It is not
intended to provide an elaborate quantification scheme which
removes the need for experience and judgment.
E DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL'S WEIGHTINGS
1. Quantity
Low production quantities make successful second
sourcing difficult, at best. None of the methods will work
well under such circumstances. By the time the second source
is qualified as a producer, the savings potential on the re-
maining quantities will probably not justify the associated
expense. In the post-production phase, the difficulties
usually associated with the qualification of a second source
through the use of a TDP make that method especially undesir-
able; whereas, the relative simplicity of the F-^ technique
yields the greatest probability of success when low quantities
are involved. Only where the magnitude of the system and its
price are truly significant will small quantities justify the
use of the DL, LF, or CT methods. As quantities rise, the
viability of all the methods increases. Because there is a
dilution of the total quantities to be produced subsequent to
initial production, the pre-production portion of the model
appears slightly more favorable than the post-production
portion with respect to quantity.
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2 . Duration of Production
The rationale provided in the discussion on quantity
also pertains to the duration of production variable. Any
attempt to qualify a second production source will take time,
and the likelihood of success decreases as the time required
for the qualification of a second source increases. DL and
LF techniques are therefore especially unsuitable since both
assume original production by the development contractor.
3. Slope of the Learning Curve
If the demonstrated learning curve of the original
producer is flat, all methods are worthy of consideration.
Where steep learning is exhibited, the original producer will
experience a significant competitive advantage for future
awards; and, if cost savings is the object of the second
sourcing effort, it may be extremely difficult to justify
going to an alternative source. It should be noted, however,
that a steep learning curve might also indicate that the
base price was unrealistically high in the first place --




DL, LF, and CT are techniques that are designed to
provide the necessary liaison and cooperation to assure
effective transfer of even highly complex technology. CT is
especially effective under such circumstances since the teams
can be constituted such that complementary technologies can
.1 be brought together. Wlien production by an original source




a team of competitors might be attracted to vie for follow-on
production contracts. Problems with TDP ' s are often insur-
mountable without costly and labor intensive effort when
high levels of technology are involved. It is not impossible
to use this method in such cases, however, extreme care must
be exercised to ensure the adequacy of the data package and
to ensure the choice of a second source which is likely to
be capable of overcoming data package problems. The simpler
the system, the more probable becomes the success of all the
methods.
5. State-of-the-Art
The same rationale provided for the technical
complexity factor applies to the state-of-the-art variable.
The more liaison between the production sources, the greater
is the chance of successful technology transfer. Transfer




Other Government and Commercial Applications
Where there are expected to be significant al-
ternative uses for the system, the original producer may be
expected to claim or generate legal or quasi-legal barriers
(patents, trade secrets, proprietary data) to the dissemi-
nation of his design unless he is handsomely compensated or
is given specific protection in the form of limitations
placed on the use of his design. DL provides royalty pay-
ments to the developer/original producer; F does not require
the transfer of data; and CT arrangements specify that both
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members of the team will be capable of producing the end item
so these methods facilitate the award of alternate follow-on
production contracts. With a TDP, the post-production use of
the method is less attractive since the original producer will
usually have proof of alternative uses rather than conjectured
alternatives
.
7. Degree of Privately Funded R&D
If the contractor's privately funded R&D led to the
development of a design that the government selects for pro-
duction, it is almost certain that a significant amount of
proprietary data will be included in the design package. In
such a circumstance, he is likely to vehemently resist any
attempt to disseminate that information. With DL and CT
methodologies his rights will be protected or he will receive
compensation for the use of his data so his resistance will
be somewhat less violent. Although it is difficult to imagine
a situation wherein all the R&D would be privately funded, the
existence of a single critical process that is truly proprietary
will greatly lessen the chance of second sourcing success.
8. Special Tooling Costs
When the cost of special tooling is significnat, the
willingness of potential competitors to enter the market --
without provision of government-owned tooling or unless the
quantity and duration of production is sufficient to allow
ammortization of the costs of such tooling — is limited.
Regardless, the original producer will have a real competi-
tive advantage where high tooling costs are included. Even
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where the tooling is government-owned, the potential disruption
associated with the transfer of the tooling may be unacceptable
— requiring duplicate tooling to be provided. A contractor
teaming arrangement, subsequent to initial production, might
result in the need for three separate sets of tooling —
making such an arrangement particularly unpalatable.
9
.
Cost of Transferring Unique Government-Owned Tooling
Shifting of production units from one source to
another implies one of two alternatives: (1) shifting the
government-owned tooling, or, (2) providing additional —
perhaps excess — capacity in the form of duplicate tooling
and equipment. Of course, where mobilization base consider-
ations are controlling, the latter is mandated. Also, where
the cost of buying duplicate tooling is less than or equal to
the cost of transferring the tooling from year to year
(including disruption costs) , this variable may be eliminated
from consideration. Since the cost of transferring tooling
and equipment has an equivocal affect on all methodologies,
the weighting assigned to each is identical.
10
.
Capacity of the Developer/Original Produce r
When the original producer does not have sufficient
capacity to allow him to manufacture the desired system in
required quantities, at required quality and to deliver those
systems in accordance with the prescribed schedule, any of
the methods may be considered. ll^ere sufficient or excess
capacity exists with the original producer, it may be more
costly (especially in the short run) to second source than
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it is to remain with the original source alone. Cutting the
quantities awarded to a source, with existing excess capacity,
usually means that the fixed overhead must still be spread
over the now lower quantities — yielding higher prices.
11. Maintenance Requirements
Where field level maintenance needs are relatively
insignificant, second source production presents little or
no problem. As the need for field maintenance increases,
however, the non-identical nature of second sourced systems
becomes more difficult to accomodate. F systems usually
exhibit the least degree of commonality and therefore cause




The longer the lead time associated with the pro-
duction of the system, the more difficult it becomes to bring
alternative producers on line early enough to realize the
potential advantages of second sourcing. This holds true
regardless of the second sourcing method chosen.
13. Contractual Complexity
The more complex the contractual relationship between
the original producer and the government, the greater are the
barriers to successful second sourcing. Life Cycle Cost
parameters. Reliability Improvement Warranties and other con-
tractual complexities become difficult to enforce when deal-
ing with multiple sources. In fact, the cost of maintaining
multiple source warranties may become prohibitive.
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14. Degree of Subcontracting
Where there is a great deal of subcontracting or
where the number of firms capable of performing subcontracting
functions is limited, the advantages of second sourcing the
prime contract will be diluted. Given the fact that the
primes may be forced to compete for the services of the same
subcontractors, or use the materials of a single supplier, the
prices may even rise with second sourcing.
F. USE OF THE MODEL
As stated earlier, the model is not designed to be a
strictly quantified decision-making device wherein the evalu-
ation factors for each method are summed and the method with
the highest "score" is selected. The correct use of the model
requires the use of judgment at every step. The first (and
possibly most difficult) step is to evaluate the acquisition
situation in terms of the decision variables (that is, to
determine whether the acquisition will cover high, medium, or
low quantities; whether technical complexity is high, medium,
or low; and to make similar judgments about the other
variables) . The program manager is encouraged to add new
variables to the list as he sees the need fot them. The next
step is to evaluate the second sourcing methods in relation
to the variables which exist in a program — realizing that
some variables will be more important than others. One
method may turn out to dominate all the others or there may
be more than one feasible method. Additional judgment will,
therefore, be required. It may even be possible to allow
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the competing contractors to have an input to the decision
process. If the model can simplify and guide the thought
process so that: (1) all significant variables are recognized
and objectively evaluated, (2) clearly inappropriate second
sourcing strategies are eliminated, and (3) an appropriate
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions can be drawn from the research:
* It is clear that the concept of competition enjoys a
high degree of support from a wide range of advocates. In
order to successfully incorporate competition into an overall
Acquisition Strategy, however, the program manager must under-
stand what constitutes effective competition in both the
design and production phases of his acquisition program.
* The current acquisition instructions address the subject
of design competition in considerable detail. The instructions
specify the reasons for, and the general approach that should
be taken in the generation of design competition. However,
the instructions fail to distinguish between design and pro-
duction competition. They allude to the concept of production
competition only in vague and very general terms. No guidance
is provided as to the advantages or problems associated with
obtaining a second production source, the methods available
for generating a second source, or the decision- making
process by which a second sourcing method should be selected.
* Second Sourcing may not be appropriate for all acqui-
sition programs, particularly those with short production
lives and/or low production quantities. However, where it
is feasible, the establishment of a second source may provide
substantial benefits to the government, such as;
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(a) Broadening t±ie produ-ction base.
(b) Cost savings from production competition, possibly
in the billions of dollars per year.
(c) Smoothing out the fluctuation in the defense industry
which leads to feast or famine situations for individ-
ual firms.
(d) Achieving superior equipment through increased com-
petition.
(e) Facilitating NATO participation as co-producers or
through offsetting co-production as subcontractors.
(f) Facilitating the attainment of socio-economic goals
by increased award to minority and small business
contractors
.
(g) Reducing the propensity for buy-ins.
(h) Disengagement of some government controls from the
contractural relationship.
* Decisions regarding both design and production compe-
tition should be made as early as possible in the acquisition
cycle and incorporated as an integral part of the Acquisition
Strategy.
* Contractors should be informed early in the process of
the government's intentions relative to both design and pro-
duction competition.
* In some cases the cost-saving potential of production
competition may be achieved without actually having to bring
a second source on-line. The mere existence of a viable
method for transferring part or all of the production to a
second source may be sufficient to insure that the government




* The generation of a second source, for whatever reason,
has several problems, or potential problems, associated with
it, such as:
(a) Additional front-end costs
(b) Willingness of contractors to participate
(c) Potential for unqualified contractors to buy-in
and subsequently to default
(d) Program stretch-out
(e) Maintenance of the data package/coordination of
ECP' s
These problems can be either eliminated or minimized,
however, by proper advance planning, early and forthright
communication with the contractors, and selection of an
appropriate second sourcing method.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of this research, the following recommenda-
tions are offered:
* The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) should revise
their major policy statements (DOD Instructions 5000.1 and
5000.2 and 0MB Circular A-109) to include formal recognition
of the independent concepts of design competition and pro-
duction competition. Program managers should be directed
to include both types of competition in their acquisition
strategies whenever it is feasible and appears economically
beneficial to do so.
* Additional guidance should be provided to program
managers in a separate instruction or by publication of a
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desk-guide relative to the subject of second sourcing and
production competition. In order to provide this additional
guidance, OSD should conduct a study which includes:
1. A review of several past acquisition programs which
have either successfully or unsuccessfully pursued second
sourcing/production competition. The predictive ability of
the SSMSM should be tested on these programs on an after-the-
fact basis.
2. Distribution of this thesis (or Chapter V at a
minimum) to several program managers in each of the services
who are currently involved in either the planning or the ex-
ecution of second sourcing/production competition decisions.
These program rnanagers should be directed to evaluate the
applicability and usefulness of the SSMSM and to provide
feedback to OSD in the form of modifications or additions
which would improve the usefulness of the model.
The formulation of the new instruction or desk-guide
referred to above should incorporate the knowledge gained
from the study described above.
* The Decision Coordinating Paper in support of DSARC I
should specifically address the methods selected for generating
both types of competition, or the reasons for a determinination
of the infeasibility of either type. Decision Coordinating
Papers for subsequent Milestones should address any significant
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ACQUISITION STRATEGY (excerpted from OFPP Pamphlet No.l)
One of the program manager's first tasks will be to
develop an acquisition strategy. The purpose is to get the
program manager, with his team, to think through the acqui-
sitions process and the myriad of individual considerations,
and then join them to achieve his program objective in an
economical, effective, and efficient manner.
In developing a system acquisition strategy considerable
thought should be given to speicifc program goals and objec-
tives. The approach should not be reduced to fill-in-the
blank formats or cookbooks.
The strategy should form, the basis for the program
manager's system acquisition plan. He should then use his
plan to communicate with higher authority, his management
team, interfacing government organizations, and industry.
The plan should also provide the means to measure accomplish-
ments and consider contingencies as the program progresses.
At program initiation, it is neither possible nor desirable
to address all considerations in detail. It is possible and
desirable, however, to examine and schedule when decisions on
each consideration can and must be made throughout the acqui-
sition process and to refine the strategy and planning as the
program proceeds
.
The plan should encompass the entire system acquisition
process with emphasis on the near term time phased actions.
As the program proceeds and periodic reviews are made, the
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next increment of near term considerations should be emphasized.
Such an approach minimizes the planning burden and provides a
basis for program direction and for measurement of success
against program goals and objectives.
Circular A-109 includes policies and some typical con-
siderations that should be addressed in the development of
a strategy and then reflected in a system acquisition plan.
For example: the general policy to rely on the private
sector in accordance with 0MB Circular No. A-76; the use of
contracting as a tool in the acquisition process and not as
a substitute for management; the use of competitive parallel
short-term planned dollar value contracts for well-defined
work activities during exploration of system design concept
alternatives; and preclusion of nonessential reporting pro-
cedure and paperwork requirements being placed on contractors.
There are many other necessary considerations not in-
cluded in Circular A-109 that need to be addressed by a
program manager. For example, the favorable and unfavorable
lessons learned from similar acquisitions. Still others may
be grouped in categories such as; system/product development,
business management and program management.
Some system/product development examples include:
recognition of and accommodations for risks and uncertainties
that assures proper relationship of risk sharing between
Government and contractors; the Government tailoring of
specifications and standards in consonance with contractors'
efforts and the time phased introduction of the results into
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the acquisition process (the objective being to avoid non-
essential constraints on either prime or subcontractors)
;
the Government providing guidelines for contractor develop-
ment of performance specifications for full scale develop-
ment and product specifications for production; and the
optimal use of government laboratories in furnishing technical
direction to the contractors during system development.
Some business management examples include: obtaining
and sustaining competition, including high cost subsystems
which may be proposed; accommodating procurement lead times;
precluding technical transfusions and "auctions" in the
proposal evaluation, source selection, and negotiation
process; and providing contractually for proposal submittals
for the next planned increment in the acquisition process.
Some program management examples include: selection of
a project management organizational mode such as vertical or
matrix; the appropriateness and applicability of incremental
approvals of contractors efforts throughout the acquisition
process; and the applicability of Government policies for
standardization and interoperability with systems of friendly
countries.
In conjunction with the development and tailoring of an
acquisition strategy, the program manager should establish
an analysis structure and decision mechanism to handle both




This Appendix is an excerpt from a November 19 73 study
performed by the Logistics Management Institute entitled
"The DOD-Contractor Relationship." In the opinion of this
researcher, this segment of the study argues so eloquently
and forcefully for the use of production competition that it
is more meaningful to include several pages directly from
the study than to attempt extensive paraphrasing of the text,
3. Cost Based Profits
The ASPR is clear on the importance of profit in
the structure of the DOD-Contractor relationship:
It is the policy of the Department of Defense
to utilize profit to stimulate efficient con-
tract performance. Profit generally is the
basic motive of business enterprise .^
The method used to apply the profit motivation in
negotiated contracts has been to base profit objectives on
the estimated cost of contract performance. There are those
who feel that the principle communicated to contractors has
been: The higher the costs, the greater the profit dollars
that will be accepted by the government buyer.
The basing of profit on costs is more explicitly
stated in the weighted guidelines method introduced into
ASPR in 1963. ^
ASPR 3-808. 1(a). (Underscoring added).
ASPR 3-808.2.

The four major profit factors are applied to specific items
of costs or to the total estimated cost of performance.
Prior to 196 3, under ASPR policies dating back to the Armed
Services Procurement Act of 19^47, although fee limitations
were stated in terms of percentages of cost, profit was not
so explicitly keyed to costs. Nevertheless, the base of costs
on which the selected profit percentage was applied was one of
the most significant factors affecting the profit objective.
Indeed, the history of deriving profit by applying an essential-
ly fixed percentage to estimated costs of performance was one
of the reasons for the introduction of the weighted guidelines
method.
The current test of a policy basing some part of the
profit objective on a contractor capital employed reflects an
effort to move away from the base of costs. For valid reasons,
one-half of the profit objective will continue to be based on
costs. ^ Nevertheless, to the extent that profit is a moti-
vating influence a policy which bases profit on costs does not
encourage contractor efforts to reduce costs. If a contractor
reduces direct costs, he reduces the cost base on which profits
LMI, Study of Profit or Fee Policy, Project 5B1,
January, 1963, pp. 42-43. (AD 472065)
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on follow-on contracts will be negotiated. If a contractor
reduces overhead costs, he reduces the base for all future
contracts
.
There is empirical evidence that cost-based pricing
leads to excessive labor and higher costs. Arditti and Peck
found that the aircraft industry had, in fact, a significantly
lower labor elasticity than industries subject to conventional
pricing constraints. More labor was retained during periods
of sales declines, with implications of far-reaching conse-
quences for cost growth:
An excess labor supply is unlikely to be actually
idle; rather it is at work. The resulting work
requires additional materials, subcontracting, and
even complementary labor.
One might argue that the resulting work ought
to be counted as a positive blessing of excess labor,
which offsets its extra cost. But the use of such
workers may lead to an entire style of development
that overemphasizes complexity and maximum perform-
ance, and disregards costs and timeliness. This
development style is hardly reversible as the cycle
of weapons industry sales proceeds. The long run
costs of lower labor elasticity, then, may not be
those measured here, but rather its contribution
to a markedly nonoptimal development style.
^
This effect has probably had much to do with the failure
of incentive contracts to motivate contractors to reduce costs
on given contracts. See, for example, Irving N. Fisher, A
Reappraisal of Incentive Contracting Experience , RM-5700-PR
(Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation , July, 196 8) , and John M.
Parker, Jr. , An Examination of Recent Defense Contract Outcomes
in the Incentive Environment
,
(Dayton, Ohio: AFIT, September,
1971) . (AD 731764)
2 • •Fred D. Arditti and Merton J. Peck, Cost-Based Pricing







The most explicit statement we have found on the
motivational effect on a cost-based profit policy was made
by Mr. Clarence "Kelly" L. Johnson, Senior Vice President,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation:
Now if the Skunk Works thing has been so good,
why don't more peop.l.e use it?... Fewer people
are required, therefore the profit is less.
Say what you want, I don't care what form of
contract you've got, if it takes a raft of
people, you make more money.
In the commercial marketplace, private enterprise
firms — which are profit maximizers (seeking the highest
possible return to their stockholders) , and which compete
with each other in price competitive markets — ideally
. . 2
assure the attainment of maximum economic efficiency.
However, many firms are not competitive profit
maximizers. H.T. Keplin has pointed out that the failure
of the firm to maximize profits will usually indicate the
3
existence of economic inefficiency. O.E. Williamson has
National Security Industrial Association, Seminar on
ij Prototyping , 23-24 February 1972, p. 38.
This is a well accepted point: of economics and several
empirical studies substantiate it: David R. Kamerschen and
Richard L. Wallace, "The Costs of Monopoly, in the Ant i-trust
Bulletin , Vo. XVII, Number 2 (Summer 1972), pp. 485-496.
David R. Kamerschen, "An Estimation of the 'Welfare Losses'
from Monopoly in the American Economy," Western Economic
Journal , 4 (Summer 1966), pp. 221-236.
^H.T. Keplin, "The Profit Maximization Assumptions,"
Oxford Economic Papers, 15:2 (July, 1963), pp. 130-139.
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provided a detailed theory of the inefficiency arising from
behavior not directed at profit maximization and has analyzed
a number of historical cost studies in which great profit
improvements and reductions in waste were obtained by re-
orienting the objectives of management.
Many firms are no longer controlled by their owners.
Berle and Means were the first to recognize the implications
2
of the separation of ownership and control. Although manage-
ment may attempt to obtain enough profit to provide for a
reasonable and gradually increasing dividend, it is free to
pursue other objectives rather than concentrating on profit
maximization. These other objectives may be sales growth,
the growth of management teams, the pursuit of managerial
emoluments, or the minimization of risk. Profit maximization
yields no particular utility to professional managers, who do
the work but collect only a fraction of the dividends.
On the other hand, management could be concerned
with maintaining the firm's market position, adding
to the firm's sales revenue, or increasing the
total assets controlled by the firm. This could be
the case when managerial salaries and/or job security
are thought to be related to variables such as the




'"Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Discretionary
Behavior: Managerial Objectives m a Theory of the Firm
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964).
^A.A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property (New York: The Macmillan
Company , 19 33)
.
^Ira Horowitz, Decision Making and the Theory of the Firm
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1970), p. 292.
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Corporate sales — not corporate profits — are the
variable to which executive salaries appear to be tied. ''
Maurer found that a substantial amount of inferior perform-
ance could be produced by management without incurring a
penalty for the performance. Palmer found that among firms
with a high degree of monopoly power, management-controlled
firms report significantly lower profit rates than owner-
controlled firms.
Since the government attaches considerable importance
to expertise, people, and plant, its contractors are motivated
to maximize these attributes. Hunt, Perry, and Rubin found
4
evidence of the hoarding of engineers and plant. Current
employment of staff is associated with long-term expectations
of future business, and unused plant capacity was particularly
David R. Roberts, "A General Theory of Executive Com-
pensation Based on Statistically Tested Propositions,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXX:2 (May 1956), pp. 270-294.
J.W. McGuire, J.S.Y. Chin, A.E. Elberg, "Executive Incomes,
Sales, and Profits," American Economic Review , LII:4
(September, 1962)
, pp. 753-765.
2Herrymon Maurer, Great Enterprise (New York: The Macmillan
Company , 19 55)
.
John Palmer, "The Profit-Performance Effects of the
Separation of Ownership from Control in Large U.S. Industrial
Corporations , " Bell Journal of Economics and Management
Science, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. 293-303.
Raymond G. Hunt, Ira S. Rubin, and Franklyn A. Perry, Jr.,
"Federal Procurement: A Study of Some Pertinent Properties,
Policies, and Practices of A Group Of Business Organizations,"





high among firms with a high government- low commercial
mix. Future survival depends on winning contracts, which
depends on having ample capacity.
Although companies may not be profit maximizers,
they are not indifferent to profit opportunities. Profit
serves as a means to an end — it provides the slack and
discretionary funds which permit the corporation to pursue
its long-range planning and growth strategies. Government
policy reflects a view of profit as a corporate goal, while
industry views profit as a means to a goal -- the goal of
increasing sales and building a reputation. Profit is an
uncertainty reducer which yields the corporations a sense of
independence.
Peck and Scherer in their examination of the in-
centives to contractors to maximize capabilities and exper-
tise concluded much the same thing. The fact that in most
cases contractors have not performed well under incentive
contracts also substantiates this view. Incentives have
little value to contractors as performance motivators.
Respondents in the Hunt, Rubin, and Perry Study criticized
the methods used to evaluate their performance and believed
them unlikely to encourage exceptional perfoirmance. In
practically no cases did incentives materially affect the
Merton J. Peck and Frederick M. Scherer, The Weapons




research results. In fact, line operating personnel
frequently were unaware of the incentive provisions. Con-
tractor personnel felt that the contract outcome was largely
determined by the ability to maintain a substantial informal
interaction with the customer. In contrast, government
personnel place substantial emphasis on the appropriate form
of the contract and the potential for profit to the con-
tractor. A basic difference of opinion exists here. To the
degree that contractors are not strongly profit oriented,
government profit polocies and approaches to the motivation
of contractors by varying profits are ineffective..
Hunt, Rubin, and Perry describe a special type of
firm — one devoted more to maximizing future capacity than
to reducing present cost. Entrepreneurial activity consists
of getting the next government program -- not in reducing
costs or other types of actions usually associated with
entrepreneurs. The typical contractor resembles a bureaucracy
He employs a large staff to handle customer relations and
negotiates for budgets and levels of inputs in exchange for
a program or level of effort. Measurements of the efficiency
of production in terms of an output measure are unavailable.
Perhaps the most important aspect of all is the significance
of survival as a first objective of the firm. The goal of
Niskanen's model of a bureaucracy could equally well
be applied to many defense contractors. William A. Niskanen,
Jr. , Bureaucracy and Eepresent-ative Government (Chicago:




survival best explains the failure of Contract Definition to
achieve the verification of design and engineering sought under
DoD Directive 3200.9:
The main motivation, overwhelming ..everything else,
is survival. And in an environment as turbulent
as defense-space contracting was during the 1960 's
the kinds of behavior required to maximize one's
chances of surviving are quite different from and
may in some respects conflict with close cost con-
trol on individual contracts. The sin qua non of
survival for major system suppliers is winning new
development program awards. It is to this, rather
than cost control, that the bulk of top management
energies was directed. As the number of new programs
dwindled and as the size of individual programs rose,
defense suppliers vied more and more strenuously for
the few new programs available. The pressure to go
along with unrealistic technical specifications re-
quests of government planners and indeed to go beyond
them became irresistible. This built-in unrealism in
turn lead to the numerous performance failures and
cost overruns which have now become all to familiar.
The best talent in contractor technical organizations
was put to work almost continuously participating in
source selection competitions of a highly detailed
and protracted character, but stopping short of the
actual hardware development and testing through -.which
real technical uncertainties must be resolved.
4. Contractor Cost Control
The present emphasis on cost as a significant program
criterion suggests that contracting methods in the past have
failed to orient contractor management toward effective cost
control. Cost type contracts and the lack of effective price
competition have contributed to this.
Statement of Frederic M. Sherer, Weapon System Acqui-
sition Process , Hearings of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, 92nd Congress., 1st Sess . , December, 1971, p. 142
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a. Cost Type Contracts
The first deficiency of a cost type contract
is that it does not encourage economy nor discourage accumu-
lation of excess capacity. A more insidious deficiency is
its tendency to encourage a relaxed attitude: an attitude
based on a view that "it will cost whatever it must cost" —
as if after-the-fact we will know what we lacked foresight
to estimate before-the-fact. This elevates actual cost to
the status of should cost when it is only a coincidence if
they are the same. This deficiency was noted long ago in a
study of World War II contracting policies:
A representative of the aircraft industry summed
up his company's views as follows: 'The general
belief of our corporation has- been that it is an
insidious thing to get into the habit of operating
under CPFF contracts. You can't help letting it
be known that you haLve a CPFF contract, and the
general tendency of management and I think of
everybody else is to relax a little.
'
Evidence of efficient operations under well
administered CPFF contracts were cited. The
incentive in such cases, however, was not
provided in the contract but instead reflected
management's fear that bad habits acquired in war-
time would be a serious liability in peacetime
civilian productionT^
A closely related point is Williamson's
argument that both the government and its contractors have
John Perry Miller, Pricing of Military Procurements




seen benefits in large, cost type contract undertakings
reflecting uncertainty and defying cost-performance evalu-
ation.
b. Price Competition
The striving for competition is, in large
part, attributable to a senxe of futility that many people
in the government share concerning the ability to obtain
economy by other means. There is a sense that efforts to
control costs by audit, negotiation, or contract administra-
tion, while essential when competition cannot be obtained,
are not adequate substitutes for price competition.
The "should cost" efforts are a case in
point. To the extent that these efforts have been success-
ful in obtaining lower prices on current purchases of an
item, they reflect also the fact that past inefficiencies
have resulted in higher costs than necessary in previous
purchases of that item. Another case in point is the
commentary on past results reflected in the passage of
Public Law 87-653, popularly called the "Truth in Negotiations
Act. " There is more than casual evidence of the folk wisdom
Oliver E. Williamson, Defense Contracts: An Analysis
Of Adaptive Response , RM-4 36 3-PR (Santa Monica: The RAND
Corporation, June, 1965) , pp. 8-9. Essentially the same
paper by Mr. Williamson is found in "The Economics of
Defense Contracting: Incentives and Performances." in





reflected in an old saying among government contracting
personnel: "If you have competition, you don't need
negotiators; if you don't have competition, negotiators
won't do you much good." A study of competitive subcon-
tracting by The RAI^D Corporation led to essentially the
same conclusion that "price analysis' is apt to be a poor
substitute for price rivalry."
Price competition is expected to result in
lower prices (or reduced costs) compared with sole source
purchases. The important question is: How much lower?
The answer appears to be somewhere between 15 and 50 percent
lower.
* Secretary McNamara testified to Congress that
an average savings of 25 cents was realized
for each dollar shifted from non-competitive
to competitive-type contracts. He presented
eleven recent examples of savings achieved;
these examples showed an average savings of
33 percent.
2
* Later in the same hearings, Mr. William Newman,
Director of Defense Accounting and Audit
Division of the General Accounting Office,
stated: "The figure of 25 percent saving, Mr.
Chairman, I would say is conservative, based
on our audit work."^
^Robert E. Johnson and George R. Hall, Public Policy
Toward Subcontracting , RM-4570-PR, (Santa Monica: The RAND
Corporation, May, 1965), p. 30.
^U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Federal Procurement and Regulation, Hearings , Economic





An earlier study by LMI developed average
savings of 22.5 percent experienced in
competitive subcontracting by a major prime
contractor.
An intensive program of competitive sub-
contracting on the C-141 program by Lockheed
resulted in average savings of 36 percent —
the savings being measured as the difference
between the sum of the low bids received
from technically acceptable firms and the sum
of the mean bids. The mean bids are assumed
to be a reasonable approximation of the price
that might have been paid if several sources
had not been solicited.^
An examination of some 2000 contracts let by
formal advertising showed that the mean of
all bids received exceeded the lowest accept-
able bid by more than 30 percent in 49 percent
of the cases.
A recent study of selected electronic equip-
ments shifted from sole-source to competition
concluded that "reasonable confidence could
be attached to using at least a 40 percent
reduction for planning purposes."
-•Logistics Management Institute, Analysis of Extent
of Competitive Procurement by DoD Prime Contractors (1964)
,
pp. 31-33.
''Robert E. Johnson and George R. Hall, Public Policy
Toward Subcontracting , RM-4570-PR (Santa Monica: The RAND
Corporation, May, 1965), pp. 24-30.
George R. Hall and Robert E. Johnson, Aircraft
Co-Production and Procurement Strategy , R-450-PR (Santa
Monica: The RAND Corporation, May, 196 7) , p. 16 3.
U.S. Army Electronics Command, The Cost Effects of
Sole Source vs. Competitive Procurement (Fort Monmouth,





* Steckler references additional examples of
savings as high as 70 percent, condluding
that "absence of adequate competition
has increased the cost of aerospace products
by about 25 percent.-^
The cases noted all relate to equipments; none
relate to systems in the sense of aircraft. To supplement
these studies LMI analyzed the production costs for air-
craft produced under competitive conditions — conditions
obtained where there was a close substitute in the inven-
toiry of operational aircraft — contrasted with the pro-
duction costs for aircraft where there was no close substitute.
The basis of the analysis was a comparison between actual and
expected costs. The analysis, which is described in detail
in Appendix III, indicated that savings of as much as 15 per-
cent resulted from competition between possible substitutes.
This analysis adds yet another dimension to the subject:
competition need not be over designs for identical applica-
tions. The benefit of competition are obtained if the
products are substitutes for each other in application. This
provides additional support for the DoD program of competitive
prototyping of selected systems that has been endorsed by the
House Committee on Appropriations
:
The Committee feels that to obtain the maximum
advantage from the prototyping concept, competition
between at least tow companies on each system should
be established. The incentive which would be given
the contractors involved would be substantial. The
'"Herman O. Steckler, The Structure and Performance






one which performed best could anticipate a profit-
able procurement contract. The loser could antici-
pate no procurement contract.-'-
c. The Cost of Competition
Competition in an environment of a high degree
of technical and price uncertainty has proven to be bad pro-
curement strategy. To reduce the technical uncertainty to
acceptable limits, while retaining a competitive environment,
DoD must sponsor competitive development between two or more
sources. Whether the incremental cost of maintaining such
competition exceeds the benefits is relevant and important.
The incremental costs depend on the complexity of the systems,
the program phase where uncertainty will be reduced to manage-
able proportions , and the quantity expected to be produced.
There is evidence, however, that the incremental cost may be
less than supposed.
George S. Schairer developed some hypothetical
cost data showing the typical flow of money into an aircraft
development and production program.^ The elements of cost for
U.S. Congress., House, Committee on Appropriations,
"Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 19 72," H.R. Kept.
92-666, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., (1071), p. 13.
^The Role of Competition in Aeronautics , The Wilbur and
Orville Wright Memorial Lecture of the Royal Aeronautical
















Production costs -- 500 units 375
Changes during production 35
Total Program Cost 460
The incremental cost of maintaining competition
between two sources through prototyping and flight test
(25 cost units additional) add only 5.5 percent to the pro-
gram costs in this example. Maintaining competition through
production engineering and development test (12 cost units in
addition to the 25) would add only 8 percent to the program.
Maintaining competition through production, by dividing the
total quantity between the two sources, adds substantially to
the total program costs as a result of the effect of progress
(or learning) curves.
It is possible that Mr. Schairer's hypothetical
data give results more sanguine than would be developed for
a specific new military program. Nevertheless, they suggest
the possibility that competition could often be obtained at
a cost less than the expected savings resulting from maintain-
ing a competitive environment. At the very least, they
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suggest that providing competition for new systems by support-
ing efforts to upgrade an existing system is a sound acqui-
sition strategy. "The incremental cost to have competition
by the use of model change is probably always negative and
very favorable. ...I can assure you that it was the com-
petitive threat that the Air Force would buy a new airplane
from somebody else that caused Boeing to devise the (B-52)







February 13, 19 79
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MARTIN
SUBJECT: Establishing Second Source for Production of Defense
Equipment
By memorandum addressed to the Assistant Secretaries of
the Services and the Director, DLA, dated 18 January 1979,
Mr. Dale W. Church expressed his desire, to identify one
or more alternative acquisition strategies which would more
often lead to establishment of a second source at an
early period in a production cycle. He solicited recom-
mended alternatives to be discussed at a meeting on 14
February 19 79, the purpose of which was to arrive at a
point where some uniform guidance may be drafted (Atchl)
.
By memorandum dated 29 January 19 79, you designated
the undersigned to attend as the AF representative and ex-
pressed your intention to be kept fully informed as to the
proposed recommendations (Atch 2)
.
I have met with representatives of the Air Staff for
the purpose of discussing the nature of the problem and to
consider our inputs, including responses to a message sent
by the Air Staff to AFSC and AFLC (Atch 3) . The result is
a Talking Paper (Atch4) which I propose to give to Mr.




1. Dale Church Memo dtd. 18 Jan 79
2. Memo 29 Jan 79








ESTABLISHING SECOND SOURCE FOR PRODUCTION OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT
There is no one recommended alternative to best establish
a second source for production of defense equipment. There
are a variety of acquisition methodologies which can be used,
but each approach has attendant consequences which may be
either assets or liabilities. Therefore, it is our view that
the subject is best addressed in the following logical
sequence: policy goal(s); intrinsic nature of the defense
equipment to be acquired; and, available acquisition strategies/
methodologies
.
There are many reasons for establishing a second source,
one or more of which may apply to any given acquisition.
Some of these reasons are compatible with one another and
some are not. Those we have identified are (1) broadening
the production base, (2) evening out the fluctuation in
defense industry which leads to feast or famine situations
for individual firms, (3) achieving savings through increased
competition, (5) facilitating NATO participation as co-
producers or through offsetting coproduction as subcontractors,
(6) facilitizing the attainment of socio-economic goals by
increased award to minority and small business contractors
and/or subcontractors, and (7) preserving competition for
the sake of competition per se.
To insure selection of the acquisition alternative
which would best accomplish establishment of a second source
early in a production cycle first requires prioritization
of the above goals. There is no one methodology which can
accomodate all these goals in any given acquisition. OSD
guidance must recognize this fact and should not be couched
in terms of recommended contracting alternatives. There
are contracting alternatives but their order of preference
is dependent upon which policy goal or combination of goals
is sought in the instant acquisition.
Having resolved the policy goal(s) to be met, it is
essential to then understand and evaluate the intrinsic
nature of the defense equipment to be produced. The follow-
ing list, perhaps not all inclusive, enumerates the kind of




(1) Intrinsic nature of the item to be produced in terms
of its technical complexity, the state of the art,
the fabrication process involved, and the tolerance
required;
(2) Existing industrial capacity;
(3) Ultimate quantity to be produced and the rate at
which the Government will place orders for production;
(4) Production leadtime;
(5) Investment in capital facilities and tooling required
for production;
(6) Production startup and other nonrecurring costs, in-
cluding first article acceptance testing;
(7) Logistics concept to be employed;
(8) Political environment;
(9) Degree to which production will require access to
proprietary technical data and/or manufacturing
process ; and
(10) Potential for commerciality and/or the existence of
essentially equivalent hardware in the commercial sector.
With answers to the aforementioned, together with
identification of the DOD goal(s), it is feasible to evaluate
which of the following contracting methodologies may
best accomodate establishment of a second source early in
the production cycle. These options, not listed in any
particular order of preference, are:
(1) Establishment of a Qualified Products List (QPL)
,
best suited for instances where there is a continuing
requirement, the costs for qualifying the product are
not unreasonable, and the quantity and rate at which
the equipment is acquired facilitates uninterrupted
production by competing producers.
(2) Leader/Follower Concept wherein the producer provides
technical assistance and data rights necessary for
other concerns to coproduce. The coproducer can be a
designated subcontractor, a subcontractor selected
by the prime producer, or a direct supplier to the Govern-
ment. This is best accomplished by competition for full
scale engineering development in the form of data rights
and priced options for technical assistance.
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(3) Coproduction wherein the Government, in proposal
evaluation and source selection for full scale engineer-
ing development, requires submission of a detailed
coproduction plan to insure there is a subcontractor (s)
who will produce concurrently deliverable end item
equipment, priced in the production option.
(4) Use of 10 use 2304(a) (16) to permit award to two
concurrent production contracts with a price premium
paid to insure award to a second source.
(5) Direct licensing (providing for the payment of a
royalty or a license fee) to facilitate one or more
additional sources to compete in follow-on production.
(6) Acquisition of a reprocurement data package either
for the entire system, selected subsystems, and/or
selected components.
(7) Two-phase acquisition in which the first phase is
limited to design and development with unrestricted
competition for production in accordance with the
Government's detailed production specification.
(8) Breakout after initial production of subsystem(s)
or major components for direct acquisition by the
Government.
(9) Multi-year procurement of production after the initial
production buy to insure a production base sufficiently
substantial to facilitate meaningful competition by
concerns other than the initial producer.
There are several acquisition policies which, to
varying degrees, impede second source production. To the
extent we emphasize design-to-cost and life cycle costs,
these operate against competing the subsequent production
and/or second sourcing. It is not feasible to impose RIW
commitments on a developer in the case of production
equipment manufactured by a second source. It may not be
feasible to implement design-to-cos t incentives on a
developer for production equipment manufactured by another
source. Equally troublesome is the difficulty of incentivizing
life cycle cost goals when production equipment may be
manufactured by two or more producers. Where the logistics
concept and life cycle costs considerations are pre-eminent
and strongly favor manufacture of standardized equipment by
one source, the policy objective of establishing a second




While there are several possible alternatives, no
particular one is ideally suited to best accomplish the early-
establishment of a second source in the absence or considera-
tion of and regard for competing DOD policy goals and
objectives. The selection of the preferred methodology is
in large measure dependent upon an indepth understanding
of the nature of the equipment to be produced and the
nature and funding of the program. This means that the
problem must be worked on a case by case basis. Evaluation
must be made as early in the development/acquisition cycle
as possible to insure that the various options are not
inhibited by business, budgetary and/or policy decisions
made in the absence of a full understanding of their con-
sequences .




The information presented in this Appendix is excerpted
'' from a June, 19 79 Master's Degree thesis by LCDR D.S. Parry,
SC, USN, which was written at the Naval Postgraduate School.
This Appendix presents several case studies which are examples
of some second sourcing/production competition efforts that
have been made in the past. Some of these efforts have been
considered successful, while others have clearly failed to
accomplish their objectives. This Appendix is provided in
order to point out some of the benefits that can be achieved





The following case studies are provided as illustrations
of second sourcing efforts that have been attempted to date.
Included are examples that have been declared successful as
well as some that have been branded failures. It is hoped
that examination of such cases will point out some of the
benefits that can be achieved through second sourcing as well
as the costs associated with application of the method.
ARN-84 AIRBORNE TACAN NAVIGATION SET ~ The original developer/
producer of the solid state ARN-84 was Hoffman Electronics, now
the .^AVCOM Division of Gould, Incorporated. Hoffman was the
sole-source producer of the ARN-84 until 19 75 when the Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) , believing that Hoffman's price
of $26,000 per set was excessive, decided to second source
the following year's acquisition. The Navy utilized a re-
procurement data package, originally prepared by Hoffman, to
initiate the competition. Although Hoffman drastically cut
its previous price for the ARN-84 (quoting $17,000 per set),
they were underbid by ASC Systems which submitted a bid for
only $13,000. Hoffman informed the Navy that the $13,000
figure was less than the direct material and labor costs it
had experienced over the duration of its previous production
contracts. At that time, however, Hoffman had lost a great
deal of its credibility — evidence the $9,000 drop in the
price quoted by Hoffman.
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ASC Systems (a small business) is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of LaPointe Industries and is located in Connecticut. His-
torically, ASC Systems had, after some initial production dif-
ficulties, performed successfully as a second source for pro-
duction of the ARC-51 airborne UHF radio communications trans-
ceiver. When identified as the low bidder on the ARN-84, a
Navy pre-award survey team visited the company and concluded
that it appeared qualified as a producer of the TACAN. The
'^ initial contract was subsequently awarded on 12 September 19 75
for a quantity of 200 sets at a total price of $3.2 million —
with first production units to be delivered in February 19 77.
By June 1977, the Navy was in a position wherein it needed
at least 200 more units to meet subsequent years requirements.
In a four firm competition, ASC Systems again underbid all
competitors at a price similar to that of its first contract.
The pre-award survey team again visited ASC Systems and repor-
ted good progress on the original contract.
The first production prototype passed qualification tests
in the fall of 19 76. Later that year, however, the Navy re-
ceived a request for a several month extension of its first
production deliveries on the grounds that it had never been
notified "in writing" that the first production prototype had
passed qualification tests (specifically a 500 hour mean-time-
between-failure test). Unfortunately, the Navy found that
someone in the contracts branch had, indeed, failed to mail
the required notification. The Navy was thus forced to accept
an extension of the first deliveries until mid-19 77.
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Concurrent with this revised delivery schedule, the Navy
had a third ARN-84 buy in sight. Hoffman informed the Navy
that, if a third buy went to ASC Systems, Hoffman would close
its TACAN production line. At this time, it was becoming
evident that ASC was experiencing difficulties in the manufac-
ture of acceptable full production models. If Hoffman dropped
out of the market and ASC failed to resolve the difficulties
it was experiencing, the Navy would be in real trouble. Navy
representatives thus contracted with Arinc Research Corporation
to act as consultant to ASC Systems. In late 19 77, however,
ASC Systems' production units were failing to pass required
tests. The situation, at that point, was so critical that air-
1 craft were coming off the production lines without TACANs.
Ferry pilots were even carrying TACAN sets with them to allow
acceptance of the new planes.
Consequently, the Navy awarded a sole-source contract to
Hoffman for the third year buy at a price of $17,000. In July
1978, ASC Systems' full production units still had not passed
the required 500 hour Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF) tests,
but, because of the urgent need for the units, the Navy agreed
to accept twenty sets if they could merely pass a fifty hour
burn-in test. In the following month, only two units were
delivered. In September, it was decided to terminate both
contracts. The terms of the settlement (called a discontinua-
tion) were to entail three distinct phases. Phase I allowed
payment of up to $4.3 million in allowable/allocable costs on
the two contracts. In phase II, ASC Systems can submit a
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"tenninating claim" — to be examined by the Termination Con-
tracting Officer who has the right to determine whether or not
more than the initial $4.3 million is due. In phase III, the
door would be opened for the submission of claims, however,
the total settlement cannot exceed $5.2 million under any
circumstances
.
When questioned about the problems ASC Systems encountered.
Jack Lopes (president of La Pointe) stated that "There is a
lot of information that is not included in the drawings."
/1:5_37 He also claimed that the delivery schedule was excep-
tionally tight and that he had had insufficient engineering
talent on board to resolve the data package difficulties. An
additional problem noted was that the sub-contractor, responsi-
ble for providing a required voltage regulator micro-circuit,
was providing ASC with units of inadequate quality. Since ASC
did not inspect these units on receipt, the quality problems
were not identified until it was too late.
The bottom line in this case is that second sourcing to
ASC Systems has cost the Navy approximately fifty percent more
than purchase from the original source would have cost. Though,
as noted, it appears obvious that Hoffman's 19 75 price was
indeed inflated and in need of trimming, the case illustrates
how second sourcing can result in many problems — especially
where actual qualification of the second source is not achieved
or where its production units cannot pass necessary acceptance
tests. Also in question is the quality of the pre-award survey




TSEC/KG-40 MICROMINIATURIZED KEY GENERATOR ~ The KG-40 is
Utilized for encription and decription of data being trans-
mitted over certain military tactical data links. In 19 71,
the Naval Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX) awarded a
development contract to Collins Radio Company of Newport Beach,
California for the KG-40. In 1973, a sole-source letter con-
tract was awarded to Collins for a quantity of 266 serial units
at a price of $22,874 each and 94 parallel units at $33,367
each. Two years later, Collins was again awarded a sole-
source contract for 288 serial units at $20,463 each and 74
parallel units at $30,581. In 1977, believing that Collins
was exploiting its sole-source position, NAVELEX decided to
attempt second sourcing of the KG-40. In coming to the de-
cision to second source that year's contract, NAVELEX did a
careful analysis of the risks and of the quantity projections
for future buys. Additionally, NAVELEX identified several
established and responsible contractors that were believed
capable of performing the contract. NAVELEX also audited and
verified the KG-40 technical data package — finding it suf-
ficiently complete and accurate.
The 19 7 7 contract was awarded competitively to Honewell
Corporation of Tampa Florida. The contract called for 245
serial units at $8,931 each and 686 parallel units at $11,882
each. Collins' offer had quoted prices of $15,384 and $20,523
for the serial and parallel units respecitvely . NAVELEX, in
trying to estimate the total savings associated with the second
sourcing of the KG-40, applied three years inflation to the
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unit prices paid to Collins on the previous sole-source buy
and then reduced these figures for the volume of the current
but on a 90 percent learning curve. The savings, so calculated,
are estimated at a healthy $14,800,000. Another directly
measurable benefit of the competition was the fact that NAV-
ELEX was able to increase the quantity of the contract by
approximately two thirds — as a result of the lower prices
paid to Honeywell. Also noteworthy was the significant drop
in Collins' quoted prices (ostensibly as a direct result of
the competition)
.
Though the cost savings achieved are significant, there
are other collateral benefits associated with this particular
second sourcing effort. There are now two fully qualified
producers of the KG-40 ; five other sources have been identi-
fied as technically capable of producing the KG-40 (valuable
to future competitions); and, although the technical data
package was not totally flawless, with the aid of models and
careful contracting, the acquisition achieved success.
AIR-7F SPARROW MISSILE — The Sparrow is a medium range air-to-
air missile, with solid state electronics, which guides semi-
actively to a target. Several major components of the Sparrow
have been second sourced or considered for second sourcing and
therefore deserve exploration:
Guidance and Control (G&C) Sections — Development studies
leading to the AIM-7F G&C were initiated with Ryatheon in 1964.
The first production contract was awarded to Raytheon to fur-
i nish not only the G&C sections but also such related items as
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telemetry, wings, fins, integrated logistic support (ILS)
,
special tooling, special support equipment, design data
tests, technical support services, and data. Later awards
to Raytheon required such tasks as performance improvement,
G&C design simplification, aircraft interface and operation-
al testing, and evaluation (including user system testing
and production units) . The data package resulting from
this work was considered adequate to permit second source
production of the Sparrow, so, in 19 73, a CPFF contract with
a CPAF option was issued to General Dynamics (GD) as a result
of a technical/cost competition to establish GD as a second
source G&C producer. The contract provided for performance
in two stages: (1) data generation in connection with pro-
duction preparations ($1,158,233) , and (2) manufacture and
delivery of 15 first articles and a total of 70 learning
quantity production units ($21,189,961). First article
delivery took place in May/June 1976, and, for funding reasons,
the learning quantity was later transferred to a separate con-
tract with government liability limited to $8.1 million. Since
issuance, however, the cost of those 70 units has risen to
$13.5 million. The following will demonstrate the full pro-














FFP 880 89 FPI 210 164
FFP 1110 74 FPI 210 106
FFP 1398 70 FFP 750 83
When the Navy announced that it intended to second source
the Sparrow, Raytheon prepared a rather interesting analysis
that concluded the need for a 34 percent reduction in program
costs before second sourcing could be justified on the basis
of cost savings (assuming a 70/30 split on the purchase of
45 70 missiles over a five year period) . Raytheon further
concluded that not until production rates of 2200 missiles
per year were required would second sourcing be "in the nation-
al interest." Instead, Raytheon recommended two alternatives
to second sourcing that it claimed held excellent potential
for savings:
(1) Allocate funds to provide for multiple sourcing
of additional components beyond those now multi-
ple sourced and by that means achieve the bene-
fits of increased competition at the component
level.
(2) Increase the effort on value engineering. Those
components which can be made more economically
through value engineering changes will benefit
the Navy with a single source as well _as with a
second source if one is established. /2:_37
Among the other arguments against second sourcing the Sparrow
that Raytheon offered were:
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(1) Additional tooling, qualifying, and management
costs associated with second sourcing.
(2) Progress along any assumed learning curve is
more rapid in the case of a single source than
when procurement is split.
(3) Additional costs are realized because of pro-
duction verification testing with two manufac-
turers. / 2 :_4/
Raytheon, then, did not argue that the concept of second sourc-
ing, as such, was invalid — only that is should not be applied
to the Sparrow. Based on production experience with two sources
,
Raytheon went on to calculate what it claims is a $108.2 million
cost increase between sole-source and dual source production
of the Sparrow between 1974 and 1978 (including $48.6 million
in learning missile qualification, tooling, and test equipment)
.
NAVAIR's analysis of the AIM-7F second sourcing effort was
somewhat different. By extrapolating along the learning curve
for Raytheon's sole-source production of the Sparrow, NAVAIR
estimated that through FY 1977 Raytheon's price under competi-
tion was $42.2 million less than would have been expected.
NAVAIR thus estimated that it would break even on the Sparrow
in FY 1979. Regardless of the economic analysis utilized,
NAVAIR achieved several non-financial benefits from this sec-
ond sourcing (including design improvement and mobilization
base expansion)
.
Mark 5 8 Model 3-Rocket Motors — Hercules , Incorporated
developed the Sparrow's rocket motors under a fixed price sub-
contract to Raytheon. Subsequently, Hercules became a sole-
source producer for the motors. Prior to fiscal year 19 76,
the net cost per unit for the MK 5 8 was approximately $8,40
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and there appeared little hope that the price would ever go
below $6,50 per copy. At that time, the government repre-
sentatives estimated that second sourcing the motors could
eventually lead to a price of about $5,500. At the same time,
however, ^Hercules was able to identify a new supplier of metal
parts. That find, coupled with an increase in procurement
quantities for the motors, enabled Hercules to cut its prices
to about $5,400. Since it seemed unlikely that a new source
could attain this lower price. Class Determination & Findings
(CD&F) 77-73 disapproved the request to second source the
motors. Subsequent problems with the metal parts producer and
with Hercules, however, have resulted in NAVAIR reconsidera-
tion of the need to second source. Depending of a reassess-
ment of future needs, a second source may be pursued.
Safety and Arming (S&A) Device-Mark 33 — The Mk 3 3 was
originally developed by Barry L. Miller, Incorporated of
Gardena, California. Consolidation of Miller's activities
as a consequence of the purchase of the Gardena plant and the
subsequent decision to cease production of the S&A device
resulted in the loss of the only qualified production source.
Competitive RFP ' s were utilized to award the 19 73 buy of 150
units and first articles to Piqua Engineering of Piqua, Ohio
(FFP contract for $66,240). The 1974/1975 contract require-
ments for 710 units were split under a mobilization base
exception. Four hundred fifty units went to Piqua (FFP con-
tract for $159,660) and 260 units went to Raymond Engineering
at a price of $230,980. In FY 1976, the split awarded 800
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iinits to Piqua and 360 units to Raymond; and, in FY 19 77 the
split was 1320 units to Piqua and 362 to Raymond. Although
the FY 19 78 award has not been definitized, it is known that
Raymond will receive the largest portion of the award. Un-
fortunately, deliveries over the past few years have been run-
ning about six months behind schedule. NAVAIR is therefore
planning to add a third source in the future.
Experience with the Sparrow has shown that, with some com-
plex systems, the use of a TDP for development of a second
source is feasible; however, the costs associated with such
action may be significant.
TALOS MISSILE — In 1961, Bendix Corporation was awarded a
sole-source contract for the production of the TALOS surface-
to-air missile system. Bendix subsequently produced this
missile for the Navy as a sole-source until 1966. In that year,
the Navy decided to attempt second sourcing of the TALOS. The
"know how" and experience gained by Bendix over the course of
five years of production as a sole-source supplier of the sys-
tem stood them in good stead during the second sourcing effort.
Bendix won the contract for production of the TALOS through
the end of the program in 196 8. Of real interest is the anal-
ysis of the costs associated with the procurement of the TALOS
from 19 61 to 196 8. The original production contract was award-
ed at a per unit cost of $219,000. The learning curve demon-
strated over the next five years was a shallow one (indicating
little improvement) , with the unit price on the 1965 purchase
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being $160,000, Extrapolating the learning curve, the expected
sole-source price of the 1966 contract totalled $155,000 per
unit. The award price for the contract, however, was only
$92,000 per copy — 41 percent less than projected. The sav-
ings on the 470 missiles purchased under this contract is thus
estimated at $32 million. It seems that even though the ori-
ginal producer won the contract, the mere existence of compe-
tition for the reprocurement extracted significant concessions
in the price charged.
SIDEWINDER MISSILE — The Sidewinder is the name given to a
family of heat seeking air-to-air missiles (AIM-9 series)
.
The first Sidewinder was developed at the Naval Ordnance Test
Station (NOTS) in the early 1950 's and was originally produced
in 1954. The fourth version of the missile was developed in
19 60 and PHILCO was awarded a contract to help with pilot pro-
duction and data package development for the G&C System. In
1964, the Navy advertised in the Commerce Business Daily (C3D)
for production of the AIM-9D. Raytheon was the low bidder
(40 percent below PHILCO) at $5,000 per missile. Raytheon was
thus awarded a FFP contract for production of the Sidewinder
in January 1965. As a term of the contract, Raytheon had to
prove its ability to produce by manufacturing a quantity of
ten G&C units (4 for standard Navy testing by Raytheon itself
6 for extensive ground, sled, launch, and in-place flight tests
by NOTS) . Raytheon failed in its first attempt to qualify as
a Sidewinder producer but was finally successful three months
later. Although PHILCO had been able to build its missiles
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from Navy drawings, Raytheon attributed its difficulties to
an inadequate data package. The resulting systems had expe-
rienced low yields, and, as a result, many components had
required extensive rework in order to meet specifications. It
took substantial effort on the part of Raytheon, NOTS , and
NAVAIR before the problems were overcome.
Raytheon claimed that following the requirements of the
data package did not guarantee production of qualified units --
they thus sued the Navy for $14.0 million. The case never got
to court, but, the $6.6 million settlement agreed to by the
Navy tends to support the validity of Raytheon's claim. Sub-
sequently, Raytheon produced several hundred AIM-9D's and
approximately 6,500 of the successor AIM-9Gs. The Navy insti-
tuted competitive second sourcing attempts for the AIM-9G
production lots, but, Raytheon always won the competition.
The next version of the system was the solid state AIM-9H.
With this system, the Navy received developmental assistance
from both Raytheon and General Dynamics . In the following
production phase, Raytheon was awarded a contract for 1,10
missiles and PHILCO-FORD won an additional 70 units in compe-
tition with General Dynamics. The Navy, then, offered a con-
tract for an additional 4 70 missiles which was eventually
awarded to PHILCO-FORD. Of special note, here, is the tactic
utilized by the Navy to preclude recurrence of the data pack-
age problems encountered with the AIM-9D. Provision was made
for the payment to Raytheon (the development contractor) for
the identification and correction of inconsistencies in the
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data package and specifications. The consequent successful
performance was considered to have more than justified the
additional expense incurred. This success also tends to re-
inforce the contention that the data package alone is frequent-
ly inadequate for the transfer of technology whereas interface
between the development/original production contractor and the
second source can assure effective transfer. The fact that
engineering liaison is one of the first prerequisites cited
as necessary for successful commercial licensing makes this
observation all the more convincing.
GAU-8A 30MM AMMUNITION — In 19 73, the Air Force A-10 System
Project Office (SPO) , at the completion of a competitive proto-
type phase, awarded a contract to General Electric Company
(GE) for the GAU-8A gun system. The contract called for full-
scale development and follow-on production of both the gun and
its associated ammiinition. GE ' s cubcontractor for the ammuni-
tion development and production was Aerojet Ordinance and Manu-
facturing Company. DSARC 11, in 19 74, directed GE to develop
a second source for ammunition to satisfy mobilization base
and production quantity requirements and to provide for pro-
duction competition. In fact, the concern was voiced that even
if. it were impractical to second source the gun itself, a real
cost savings potential existed in the case of the ammunition.
As in the case of razors and razor blades, ammunition, though
not the major implement/tool, accounts for a great deal of the
overall life cycle cost of the system.
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Three major companies competed for the second source con-
tract. Honeywell was finally selected. GE was still the gun
system integrator, but there were to be two ammunition sup-
pliers. Another interesting aspect of this buy was the stip-
ulation that no technological trans fer/trans fusion between
the two ammunition manufacturers could occur. The only require-
ment was that the ammunition be "form- fit- function" compatible.
This stipulation was enacted because of fears that if Honeywell
were to merely produce the ammunition to Aerojet 's drawings,
both companies would be likely to use the same sources for their
materials — a move that would do nothing to expand the mobili-
zation base even though it would introduce some measure of
price competition.
At the end of full-scale development, the procurement plan
and the DCP specified that initial production buys of the am-
munition would be achieved through the integrating contractor.
It was further averred that it was too early to bring the
second source into production since Honeywell has not yet been
fully qualified. The SPO, however, took a calculated risk and
directed production s\ib -contracts to both sources in the hope
that Honeywell would soon qualify. A split of 60 percent to
Aerojet and 40 percent to Honeywell was awarded on that initial
production buy.
In 19 76, the procurement plan still called for purchase of
the ammunition through the prime integrator, but, the SPO de-
cided to break away from the integrator and buy directly from
the two sub-contractors pursuant to the mobilization base
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exception. The RFP specified a minimum sustaining rate (20
percent of the total buy) — guaranteeing that no less than
that amount would be awarded to either competitor. Above that
minimum level, the offerors were to bid at 16 percent inter-
vals (six separate proposal points) for the entire buy. The
major evaluation criteria were cost and mobilization support
and planning. Cost and pricing data were required and full
field analysis by the Defense Contract Administration Service
(DCAS) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) were ac-
complished, with the results used in the discussions with the
two sources. Eventually a best and final offer was solicited
and both offerors were awarded quantities in excess of the
minimum sustaining rate, indicating a fair degree of competi-
tion had been achieved.
Another interesting aspect of this acquisition was the
requirement that the offerors build a capacity for a defined
peak production (FY80 requirement). In other words, both had
to have peak year tooling — meaning excess individual capacity.
The two contractors refused to comply at first, however, the
SPO overcame the problem by the use of a special termination
clause entitled "Cost Recovery for Contractor Facilities
Investment." This clause effectively says that if the acquisi-
tion is terminated, the government will assume the cost of the
unaaorti'Zed book value of the extra capital equipment. At
the same time, there was a great deal of controversy surround-
ing the use of this clause; however, it was determined that
the clause would not constitute a violation of the Anti-
116

Deficiency Act since termination of an out-year contract would
also mean cancellation of the instant contract thereby freeing
funds for the termination. The SPO claims that the only real
risk to the government occurs in the first two years. After
that, given that used machine tools are constantly appreciat-
ing, risk is believed to drop to zero.
Among the lessons learned by the Air Force during the FY77
buy were that there were too many proposal points; there should
have been an interpolation method between points; every poten-
tial award point should be incentivized (thereby preventing any
"loading" of the low award points); and, there was no need to
include any subjective evaluation criteria (price alone was a
sufficient criterion for this acquisition)
.
For the FY19 78 award, a Dual Competitive Award Methology
(DCAM) , which incorporated the above lessons learned, was
utilized. /TJ The results of that buy were truly noteworthy.
Procurement cycle times were reduced dramatically, and,
the savings estimated for that single buy are on the order
of $17.0 million — which allowed a 15 percent increase in
the acquisition quantity to be awarded at a price lower than
had been projected for the original quantity.
This case illustrates how Form-Fit-Function can be used to
effect successful second sourcing of relatively simple systems.
Here, although second sourcing was initiated for mobilization
base reasons, use of contractual language that indemnified the
second source from loss as a result of tooling-up for produc-
tion, resulted in the qualification of two sources who then
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competed vigorously for the larger portions of the awards.
Price concessions thus were realized as a collateral benefit
for follow-on purchases.
CRUISE MISSILE — The Cruise Missile engine is an example
wherein a directed technology licensing (DL) arrangement is
being utilized to provide a second production source. The
Cruise engine was originally developed by Williams Research
Engineering and Manufacturing. Given the importance of the
Cruise Missile to the national defense effort, it was deter-
mined that alternate sources must be developed to ensure the
integrity of the system against destruction of the sole-source
of manufacture. The Joint Cruise Missile Project Office
(JCMPO) thus tried to enduce Williams to agree to a licensing
agreement whereby a second source for the manufacture of the
engine could become qualified. When all attempts to secure
such an agreement failed, it was decided that the requirement
for an alternative engine be advertized in the Commerce Business
Daily and draft RFP ' s be submitted to industry.
Faced with the development of an alternative engine,
Williams finally agreed to the licensing of its engine. The
project office told Williams to consider a total of six manu-
facturers as potential second sources. Since the government
believed that more than enough adequate production facilities
already existed in the market, it was stipulated that no new
facilities were to be constructed in connection with the con-
tract. The first source recommended by Williams was rejected
by the government evaluation team; however, Teledyne which
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was determined to have sufficient capacity, technical com-
petence (since they were presently producing Harpoon Missile
engines)
,
and an excellent engineering staff, was approved
as a second source by the government.
The JCMPO is presently negotiating a definitive licensing
agreement. Among the important factors being addressed are
sharing arrangements, royalties, and, where applicable, main-
tenance. The fact that both sources will be capable of compet-
ing for both manufacture and maintenance of the Cruise missile
engine has stimulated optimism about potential for signif-
icant cost savings downstream.
The Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is expected to be
produced under a Leader-Follower concept (under a mobilization
base exception)
.
Two alternative methods of selecting the
follower are being considered: (1) competitive selection of
the follower, or (2) selection, by the government, of the un-
successful development offeror as the follower. One important
element in the source selection process will be the technology
transfer plan of the offerors. This plan is to have three
elements: a master schedule for follower development (complete
with meaningful contract events) ; a statement of work outlining
what the leader must do to make the follower capable of produc-
ing forty percent of the contract requirement; and, a proposed
work task statement for the follower. The initial contract
period for the leader- follower arrangement is fiscal year 80/81.
The first year's technology transfer effort is to be directed
at completely indoctrinating the follower (acting as a sub-
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contractor) in the leader's manufacturing approach and at
preparing the follower for pilot production.
During the next year, the follower still operates as a
subcontractor and the technology transfer effort is designed
to result in limited production of the complete system. A
capability must be developed such that the follower is cap-
able of producing between 40 and 60 percent of the FY 19 82
purchase.
In FY 19 82, it is projected that the follower will be
tasked with producing 40 percent of the leader company's pro-
duction requirement — still in a subcontractor capacity. In
case the follower encounters difficulties, the leader can re-
duce this quantity in consonance with the level of production
capability demonstrated by the follower.
In all subsequent buys , awards will be made under full
competition with government contracts being awarded to both
sources. Government tooling will be shared by both contractors
with a minimum of 40 percent going to either contractor. Buy-
out (winner take all award) may be executed at any time by the
government. Although this acquisition is in its early stages,
the procedures being utilized appear instructive. Another
good example of the use of the leader- follower technique is
found in shipbuilding contracts. Much has been devoted to




AIRBORNE SELF-PROTECTION JAMMER (ASPJ) — The U.S. Naval
Research Laboratories originally designed and developed the
ASPJ with the stated objective of providing all Navy tactical
aircraft with an acceptable probability of success and surviv-
ability during the 1980 's and beyond. It is currently sched-
uled for the F-18/A-18, F-14A, EA-6B, A-6E, and AV-8B aircraft
as a minimum. Eventually, as many as four thousand aircraft
could carry these units, making this program worth some $2.0
billion.
One of the objectives of the program is to have a high
initial produciton rate that will be maintained for a con-
siderable period of time. No single company could handle the
projected production schedule; and, at the same time, the
potential dangers of sole-source acquisition make the idea of
production competition especially attractive on a project of
this magnitude. NAVAIR, thus, introduced a relatively new
concept for this acquisition — contractor teaming. Presently,
two teams have been selected to produce engineering development
models: ITT/Westinghouse and Sanders/Northrup. Following a
critical design review in January 1980, a single team (both
members of which will be fully qualified producers of the
entire ASPJ system) will be selected and production quantities
will be awarded to the menbers of that winning team. Quanti-
ties awarded to the individual team members will be determined
on the basis of an award competition between the two former
team mates. The split itself will be determined on the basis
of cost to the government — the combination that is cheapest
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overall. Initial production deliveries are scheduled to begin
in mid-19 80.
The teaming concept is an intellectually intriguing one.
The question remains whether or not two historical adversaries
oan or will engage in the full interchange of information and
technology necessary to enable both to establish fully compe-
tent independent production lines capable of producing the
entire system. Since the resultant product will have been co-
developed, the award criteria for production buys will hinge
on price, quality, and deliveiry performance. To date, prob-
lems encountered encompass such factors as management coordina-
tion, proprietary data and process considerations, division of
labor, and other such parochial concerns. It is yet to be
determined whether or not the incentives for cooperation
($2 billion in combined sales) will be able to overshadow
the selfish concerns of the individual members.
The enormity of this project will most definitely have an
adverse effect on any losing team — in fact it has been postu-
lated that the Electronics Warfare market will necessarily
shrink because many of the losing contractors will b© unable
to recover from the loss of this contract. Perhaps the advan-
tages of cooperation, in this case, are too overpowering to be
overlooked. One government representative expressed sincere
concern, however, that the lead member of any team will have
significant incentive to ensure that the other member is never
quite fully equal to the leader — thereby securing for that
leader a competitive advantage on furture procurements.
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Regardless of the outcome, teaming is a stimulating concept
and ASPJ should be studied carefully in order to determine
the viability of the method for future projects.
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